Western University

Scholarship@Western
Political Science Publications

Political Science Department

2001

Thinking about your thesis?
Erika Simpson
Political Science, simpson@uwo.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/politicalsciencepub
Part of the Political Science Commons
Citation of this paper:
Simpson, Erika, "Thinking about your thesis?" (2001). Political Science Publications. 44.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/politicalsciencepub/44

THE

MCNAUGHTON PAPERS
Volume I

"Themes Of Canadian Security"
Edited by Peter Jones
March, 1991

General Editor of THE MCNAUGHTON

PAPERS: Alex Morrison

57

THE MCNAUGHTON PAPERS
VOLUME I

Redefining Security
Erika Simpson
(University of Toronto)
Introduction
What is "security"? Does the word "security" possess a precise
and commonly accepted meaning The concept of security is
often referred to in no uncertain terms:
politicians refer
elusively to measures which need to be taken in order to increase
national security and individuals frequently use the term to
describe a particular feeling of well-being or to denote a state of
financial health. In fact, security has come to mean so many
different things to different people that it may have no precise
meaning at all. In a seminal conceptual piece on security, Arnold
Wolfers characterizes security as an "ambiguous symbol" and draws
attention to the potential mischief which the ambiguity of the
symbol can cause.
He argues that "while appearing to offer
guidance and a basis for broad consensus, ... (the concept of
security) may be permitting everyone to label whatever policy he
favours with an attractive and possibly deceptive name."[1] If
Wolfers is correct, and security is potentially a deceptive symbol,
then our options are either to avoid using the concept entirely or
to begin chipping away at the analytical problems underlying the
way the concept of security has been conceived of. This paper seeks
to understand the way the concept of security has been treated in
the past and to offer some concrete suggestions as to some methods
or strategies which could be used to enhance security in the
future.
Levels of Security?
Besides experiencing difficulties with putting forward precise
definitions of security, analysts have found it especially difficult to compare one "level" of security with another.
For
instance, what is seen to be a threat to security at the individual
level might not be significant at the national level of analysis, or
threats to security which occur at various levels, both state and
individual, may be responded to at multiple levels of analysis.[2]
Furthermore, there is not necessarily any connection between
measures taken to enhance security at one level and increments in
security at another level - that is, an increase in the aggregate of
"security" among individual citizens does not always translate into
greater security for the state or for the leaders of a state.[3]
Nevertheless, making a distinction for analytical purposes between
levels of security can help in thinking more clearly about different
aspects of security: in particular,
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a distinction between the "individual," "national" and "systemic"
levels of analysis is made here because these typologies seem to
offer considerable exploratory power.[4]
The paper, therefore,
is divided into three sections and in each section the "traditional" approach to the concept of security at that level is considered; some of the more recent contributions to the concept of
security at that level are overviewed; and then some suggestions
regarding methods of enhancing either individual, national or
systemic security are made.
The Individual Level of Analysis
Philosophers have long grappled with the concept of security,
the roots of insecurity and the conditions which contribute to
security.
Hobbes puts forward, perhaps, the most pessimistic
exposition of mankind's condition of insecurity. For Hobbes, men
must live without security, except for what their own strength and
inventiveness can supply them with, whenever men live in a condition
of anarchy or "Warre". According to Hobbes:
During the time men live without a common Power
to keep them all in awe, they are in that
condition which is called Warre and such a
Warre, as is of every man, against every man
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a
time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to
every man; the same is consequent to the time,
wherein men live without other security, than
what
their
own
strength,
and
their
own
invention shall furnish them withal. In such
condition there is ... continuall feare, and
danger of violent death; And the life'of man,
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.[5]
Further complications are created by the fact that, according
to Rousseau, most methods for self-protection which are undertaken
in order to increase the individual's own sense of security
simultaneously menace others. For Rousseau:
It is quite true that it would be much better
for all men to remain always at peace. But so
long as there is no security for this, everyone, having no guarantee that he can avoid
war, is anxious to begin it at the moment
which suits his own interest and so forestall
a neighbour, who would not fail to forestall
the attack in his turn at any moment favourable to himself, so that many wars, even
offensive wars, are rather in the nature of
unjust precautions for the protection of the
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assailant's own possessions than a device
for seizing those of others.[6]
Both Hobbes and Rousseau are preoccupied by the condition of
physical insecurity in which man finds himself - for Hobbes
threats to man's physical security, indeed man's survival, are
derived from man's fearful nature and the lack of an overarching
authority, while for Rousseau continual physical insecurity is
dictated by uncertainty about the motives of others. But are
threats to man's physical security the only kinds of threat
relevant to individual security? There is no real doubt that
humans have a basic right to physical security: a right not to be
subjected to murder, torture, mayhem, rape, or assault.[7] Yet
even in societies where physical security is relatively assured,
individuals feel insecure. They may feel insecure because of a low
sense of self-worth, because of perceptions of threat to their
family or because of concerns arising out of larger issues
including fears about population growth, world hunger, or threats
to the environment. Although these sorts of fears may not, in the
short-term, threaten the physical security of the individual and
may, indeed, be a product of the individual's exaggerated fears,
they can nevertheless exert a deleterious effect.
Consequently, more contemporary analyses of security have
attempted to incorporate the notion of subjectively-perceived
security into the definition of security. For instance, Wolfers
ultimately defines security in' an objective sense as the absence
of threats to acquired values," and "in a subjective sense, as the
absence of fear that such values will be attacked."[8] Christian
Bay distinguishes further between two types of subjective
security: "subjective external security" refers to the degree of
consistent reassurance the individual senses in that he or she, or
the loved ones, are objectively secure; and "internal subjective
security" refers to the security deriving from self-acceptance and
selfinsight.[9]
Clearly, new concepts of security are beginning to incorporate
subjectively-rooted assessments of security.
Whereas security
formerly referred primarily to an objective measure of physical
security, any assessment of individual security must now include an
assessment of the individual's own sense of security.[10] But are
subjective and objective aspects of security separable in any
meaningful way? Any objective assessment of security will be itself
the product of the analyst's own subjectively-derived ideas about
the conditions, probabilities and nature of security. Therefore, in
order to understand more fully the components of contemporary
notions about individual security, it seems most pertinent to
explore more fully some facets of subjective security.
There are a number of problematic aspects to subjective
security which militate against its conceptual usefulness. First,
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there remain some doubts about whether absolute subjective
security is indeed desirable. For instance, Christian Bay points
out that it may be the case that "modest amounts of anxiety may be
necessary to keep humans alert and agile, intellectually and
emotionally."[11] Secondly, we are not certain whether humans
require some basic level of subjective security in order to function
nor do we know what effect inadequate amounts of security can have
on an individual. For example, Abraham Maslow argues that every
human being has two forces within him. One set of forces clings to
security or safety; the other set of forces seeks to grow and
gratify higher needs involved with intellectual and emotional
"being." What this means, according to Maslow, is that in the choice
between giving up safety and giving up growth, safety will
ordinarily win out:
"safety needs are prepotent over growth
needs."[12]
However, despite Maslow's research, it is still not known to
what extent the individual's subjective security needs must be
satisfied before the individual can become a fully functioning
human being. A third problem with assessing subjective security
stems from the profound differences among individuals in terms of
security requirements. Robert Jervis' research on the cognitive
and motivational processes of human psychology argues that individuals differ in their subjective security requirements.
According to Jervis, there are two aspects to assessing subjective
security requirements:
first, individuals differ about their
perceptions of threats to their security; and second, people differ,
about how much they value increments of security. Thus, a person
facing relatively the same threatening conditions as another may
experience a relatively higher sense of insecurity, or some
individuals may be more willing to pay a higher price to gain
increments of security than others.[13]
If Jervis is correct, and each individual's subjective
security needs differ, then this would seem to imply that
strategies and methods which seek to enhance individual security
will need to be tailored to each individual. This is a daunting
task, and one which suggests that enhancing security at the
individual level is, if not impossible, at least practically
unattainable. However, it must also be remembered that what is
practically important is not to somehow attain high levels or
absolute subjective security for each individual, but to devise
methods and strategies which to some degree enhance the individual's security. In order to do so we need first to understand that
subjective security is in practical terms immeasurable, except
insofar as subjective security denotes the absence of subjectivelyfelt insecurity.
Secondly, it is important to assess the different degrees and
kinds of individual insecurity.
By devising policies and
strategies which alleviate or eliminate individual insecurities,
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the individual's subjective security can be enhanced in a roundabout
way. In this context, therefore, strategies which enhance subjective
security are any actions or policies which ameliorate, remove, or
reduce the individual's perceptions of insecurity.
Finally, any attempt to ameliorate insecurity will necessitate
that we try to understand the physical, psychological and social
realities of those who are experiencing insecurity, and then try to
eliminate the causes of their particular insecurities. At first
glance such an endeavour might also seem overwhelming, but because
many kinds of personal insecurity will have common causes (i.e.
poverty, foreboding of nuclear war, worker alienation), the
elimination or amelioration of some of the root causes of commonlyfelt insecurities can promise quick results in terms of higher
levels of personal security for all individuals.
Therefore,
whereas the research thus far on individual security seems to have
been overly preoccupied with the task of somehow defining and
attaining subjective security, arguably an alternative approach
which seeks merely to alleviate or eliminate subjectively-perceived
insecurities may bear more fruit in the form of higher levels of
individual security all around.
The National Level of Analysis
The "traditional" approach to security at the national level
is embodied in what is referred to as the "realist" paradigm.[14]
For the realists it is basically a Hobbesian world with no escape
from eternal conflict. The realist vision of national security is
based on lessons from history which teach that security is best
obtained through preponderant military strength, through the
ability to threaten attack by superior forces and through the
demonstration of resolve rather than conciliatoriness in the face
of the enemy.[15]
Realists can trace through history incidents which demonstrate
the parabellum doctrine that "if you want peace, prepare for
war."[16] In a similar sense, realis,t orthodoxy seems to assume
that if a nation wants security in an anarchical world, obtaining
superiority of power in the form of weapons is the most preferred
strategy. Nations are advised, for instance, by the "classical"
realist thinker Hans Morgenthau to seek the maximum of power
obtainable under the circumstances because "all nations must always
be afraid that their own miscalculations and the power increases of
nations might add up to an inferiority for themselves which they
must at all costs avoid."[17]
The realist preoccupation with obtaining security through
superior strength in a largely anarchic world order is seen in
definitions of national security which emphasize a nation's ability
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to deter or sustain an attack. For example, Walter Lipmann writes
that:
A nation is secure to the extent to which
it is not in danger of having to sacrifice
core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and
is able, if challenged, to maintain them by
victory in such a war.
This
definition
implies that security rises and falls with the
ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to
defeat it.[18]
The realist preoccupation with security through military
strength is also manifested in many national security policies,of
which the best illustration is the national security policy of the
Reagan adminstration. The origins of the Reagan administration's
national security policy can be found in the founding statement of
the Committee on the Present Danger. In the statement, the Soviet
Union is perceived to be the principal threat to national security:
"The principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and to the
cause of human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon
an unparalleled military buildup."[19] Consequently for the Reagan
administration, every aspect of U.S. national security policy was
judged on its capability to protect the United States military from
the perceived Soviet threat.
Why do politicians and self-professed "realists" define
national security in such excessively military terms, and why do
they resort to such rhetoric about the enemy whenever they talk
about security? It may be because politicians have found it easier
to focus the domestic public's attention on military threats to
security, real or imagined, rather than on non-military ones.
Certainly it may be easier to build a consensus on military
solutions to-national security problems than to get agreement on the
other means of influence that a country can bring to bear on
problems that it faces.
Another explanation, however, attributes the militaristic
rhetoric surrounding national security to deep psychological images
of the enemy. Patrick Blackett has written that "once a nation bases
its security on an absolute weapon, such as the atomic bomb, it
becomes psychologically necessary to believe in an absolute
enemy."[20] However, it could also be argued that it is first
psychologically necessary to believe in an absolute enemy before a
nation can base its security on atomic weapons or weapons of mass
destruction - that is, a nation's citizens would not tolerate such
kinds of defence unless they held stark, menacing images of the
enemy. The psychological roots of enemy imagery have received scant
attention in the literature[21] but findings in the field of
attribution theory regarding "mirror imaging" indicate that enemy
images are the product of human tendencies to believe only the
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worst about our enemies (and the best about ourselves) and to deny
information about the enemy which conflicts with strongly-held
images.[223
If we reject the realist assumption that military strength
must be the primary characteristic of any national security policy,
what are some other emerging visions of national security? Chief
among the various alternative approaches to national security is
the idea that disarmament would most contribute to national
security. Disarmers or abolitionists argue that military capability
remains associated with national security in the minds of most
people because of images that are carry-overs from a time in which
they once had some relationship to international relations,
however, in reality, "the burgeoning growth of military capabilities has been the chief source of insecurity."[23]
For disarmers the very process of arming increases tensions
and exacerbates hostilities.
Indeed, the dynamics of such a
process are described by John Herz and Herbert Butterfield as a
"security dilemma." Reduced to its essentials, the theory of the
security dilemma states that attempts by the state or the individual
to gain security through power accumulation tend to provoke the
insecurity of others, stimulating them to enhance their security,
which in turn threatens the security of the other
side.
Thus, the security dilemma describes the measures and
countermeasures each side takes which can incite a vicious spiral of
increasing insecurity.[24] The most obvious manifestation of the security
dilemma is the arms race: one nation's attempt to enhance its security
through stockpiling weapons may stimulate the nation's adversary to obtain
more weapons, with the final result that there is less security for both
sides.[25]
The idea underlying the security dilemma - that one nation's
attempt to enhance its security through power accumulation may
threaten the security of others - seems to have engendered an entire
school of thought which proposes obtaining national security by
decreasing or eliminating a nation's preponderant power - that is,
through unilateral or bilateral disarmament. Essentially, the
argument is that disarmament can enhance national security by
reducing each side's fears about preemption, accidental war and
miscalculated
attack,
thus
contributing
to
greater
security
overall.[26] Also significant is the notion that disarmament can
free resources conducive to development, which can in turn enhance
national security. Thus, in the Final Document of the 1987 United
Nations Conference on the Relationship between disarmament and
development it states that:
Disarmament
would
enhance
security
both
directly and indirectly. A process of disarmament that provides undiminished security
at progressively lower- levels of armaments
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could allow additional resources to be devoted
to
addressing
non-military
challenges
to
security, and thus result in enhanced overall
security.[27]
The recognition seems to be dawning that security for nations
no longer means simply devising defence against invasion or nuclear
destruction. On the contrary, strategies based on disarmament seem
to hold the promise of higher levels of security overall.
It was mentioned previously that other concepts of national
security are being developed in addition to the realist and the
disarmament perspectives. Another recently emerging approach to
national security is the concept of "alternative security."
Alternative security describes a plethora of defence measures
including neutralism, non-alignment, nuclear-weapons free zones,
civilian defence, non-nuclear neutral zones and non-provocative
conventional defence measures.[28]
According to a prominent
exponent of alternative security methods, Ulrick Albrecht, there is
no consensus as to the exact conceptual meaning of "alternative
security," or "alternative defence" as it is sometimes referred to,
"but this lack of conceptual clarity, like that of democracy or
socialism and other political bywords, does not impair [its]
political appeal."[29]
Despite its ambiguous nature, the main underlying purpose of
proposals for alternative security seems to be to gradually wean
nations and leaders away from their dependence on force for
security, not by the direct process of abolishing weapons and the
military but by the more indirect strategy of substitution. Less
threatening "non-provocative" weapons, "civilian-based" defence
systems, "transarmament" plans and a shift toward "disengagement"
are all alternative security measures which are meant to act as
interim substitutes for present-day defence systems, which are by
and large based on nuclear weapons.[30]
However, one criticism must be made about the entire concept of
alternative security. The various proposals for alternative security
are principally intended to enhance the security of small
states.[31] But it seems that the advocates of alternative security
systems are mainly seeking changes in the national security policies
of small states so that if a war should come, and if a war is fought
on one's own territory, the preservation of the society and
environment will be possible because comparatively less harmful
types of weapons will be relied upon for defence and conflict
escalation levels will likely remain relatively low (i.e.
below the nuclear threshold).[32]
Apparently, the advocates of
alternative security policies are also preoccupied with the notion
that national security policies must somehow cope with military
threats. But, perhaps, the analysis of national security must

65

THE MCNAUGHTON PAPERS
VOLUME I

broaden its focus from thinking only about military threats and
defences.
Strategies to enhance or maintain national security must also
emphasize
economic,
social,
environmental
and
political
threats.[33] For example, a nation's security today depends just as
much on its economic health and on its ability to cope with
unexpected domestic problems as on its military preparedness.
Therefore, national security policy must also include emergency
plans to cope with such threats as interruptions in the flow of
critically needed resources; a drastic deterioration in environmental quality or the dwindling of the global supply of resources;
unprecedented national disasters (i.e. earthquakes); violence in
Third World countries; urban conflict, (exacerbated, perhaps, by
the presence of large numbers of poor immigrants and unemployed
workers); and terrorist attacks.
All these types of threats
endanger the quality of life of a nation and need to be considered
and prepared for the formulation of every national security policy.
Another healthy corrective to the current preoccupation with
defining national security in terms of weapons stockpiles would be
to define national security policy in terms of the fears which
one's adversaries may have - that is, to try to recreate the tears
which a state's enemies may have and then attempt to alleviate
those fears or insecurities.[34] In this regard the old Jewish
saying "Fear the man who fears you" is of special relevance: one
must try to understand the fears felt by other states in order to
increase one's own national security. Security policies which
attempt to alleviate the insecurity of adversaries and which
attempt to prepare for unexpected natural, economic and social
disasters may, in the end, prove to be more efficacious national
security policies than either the realist, disarmament-oriented or
alternative security proposals being circulated today.
The Systemic Level of Analysis
During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, diplomats and
politicians came to realize that a nation's security could be more
effectively enhanced by allying with other nations. For instance,
during the 1900s coalitions of nations formed which were variously
referred to as "balances of power," "concerts" or "alliances." All
the coalitions however, sought to expand the power and security of
each member nation-state by uniting its military force with
other like-minded states.[35]
The modern twentieth century
versions of these kinds of coalitions are referred to as "regional
security systems" with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the Warsaw Pact, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) and the Organization of American States (OAS) being the
most prominent examples of such kinds of regional security systems.[36]
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Underlying all these types of coalitions there remains the
conviction that national security is best preserved and enhanced
through
alliances
which
can
boast
of,
or
demonstrate,
preponderant military strength. In a sense, security is seen as a
"zero-sum" game where increases in the military security of one
alliance or bloc make the other side less secure. However, newer
approaches to enhancing security at the global level emphasize
that the pursuit of security can no longer be conceived of as a
zero-sum game. New systemic-level thinking stresses that nations,
and opposing blocs of nations, share interests; interests which,
if threatened or destroyed, would be detrimental to the security
of both sides. Therefore strategies which increase the security
of one side, and in doing so also add to the security of the
other side, are actively sought - it is, so to speak, a global
security game which need not add up to zero.
What are some emerging concepts of global security which
emphasize the existence of common interests? The primary shared
interest of nations must be to avoid nuclear war, and in this
regard there have been many proposals which seek to establish a
type of "common security" based on nuclear-weapon free zones and
negotiated conventional balances. The report of the Palme Commission on Common Security, for instance, proposes as a medium-term
measure the creation in Europe of a battlefield nuclear-weapons
free zone and a 150 kilometres wide disengagement zone on both
sides of the NATO-Warsaw Pact demarcation line.[37]
But there have also been other proposals for security which are
based on more general, shared interests. For example, Karl Deutsch
has developed the concept of "security communities": groups of
states which develop reliable expectations of peaceful relations
between them and which do not expect or fear the use of
force (i.e. Canada and the U.S.).[38]
And Barry Buzan has
considered the emergence of "security complexes," in which the
security interests of a group of states are linked together so
closely (i.e. Western Europe) that their national securities cannot
realistically be considered apart from one another, with the result
that they seem to lie in an "oasis" of relative security compared to
the rest of the "fractious" international system.[39]
But one problem with the proposals for common security,
security communities and security complexes is that they all
require close physical proximity and/or a degree of cultural
commonality between the members; one would not speak of a security
community between Pakistan and Paraguay for instance. In this
respect, the proposals seem to incline more toward a regionallybased rather than a systemic-level conception of security. Are
there any proposals to enhance systemic-wide security which are
not necessarily based on territorial proximity for their success?
Recently the term "security regime" has been coined to describe
the existence of tacit or explicit rules, principals and decision
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making procedures which exist in order to preserve or enhance shared
security interests among any and all nations and among international
organizations. A security regime exists when nations or
organizations coordinate their behaviour according to shared
principles, procedures and rules.
For instance, Nation A and Nation B may seek to control the
arms competition between them by making up rules and setting up
interdependent decision-making bodies which constrain each
nation's pursuit of a larger stockpile of weapons. Besides acting
as a constraint on each nation's behaviour, continued adherence to
the regime's rules and principles encourages each nation to
gradually develop more stable expectations about the other's
behaviour. Thus, by specifying what constitutes their shared
interests and then by seeking to coordinate their action so as to
ensure outcomes based on their shared interests, security regimes
can serve to strengthen the security of their members, which may
number anywhere from two to hundreds of member nations and
organizations. Some examples of successful security regimes are
the various arms control agreements between the superpowers.[40]
A resounding strength of security regimes is that their
creation and maintenance does not rely on "altruistic" or
"conciliatory" behaviour.
Systemic-level thinkers have been
criticized
in
the
past
for
their
utopian
illusions
about
international behaviour and their unwarranted faith in the selfless
qualities of human nature.[41] But the kind of global thinking which
advocates the creation of security regimes relies on a nation's
self-interest or "selfishness' in order for regimes to come into
being. Security regimes are based on the shared self-interest of
nations in averting war and preserving peace.
Unfortunately, however, security regimes are not necessarily
stable or durable institutions; one nation may violate the rules of
the regime if it is in its self-interest to do so. Therefore, it is
argued that the members of a security regime must remain on guard
against powers arising from within the regime which threaten to
violate its rules and procedures and they must also be prepared to
defend themselves against other nations outside the regime which
may issue military threats or resort to the use of nuclear
weapons.[42] What kinds of security policies do systemic-level
thinkers advocate which can combat these kinds of threatening
scenarios? Arguably, the first priority of a global security
perspective must be to guarantee that the life, health and survival
of humanity is assured.[43] But holding to such a principle may
mean that a nation must demonstrate conciliatoriness (appeasement)
in the face of a threat from another nation or bloc to attack using
weapons of massive destruction.
Therefore, taking a systemic-level perspective on security
might require taking the viewpoint that in the face of a suf f i-
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ciently dangerous and potent threat, the sovereignty and independence of a nation-state may have to be sacrificed for the sake of
human survival.[44]
In the long run, however, by working to
establish security communities, security• complexes and security
regimes we can hope to transform each nation's fixation with
national security into a preoccupation with first ensuring world
survival, universal well-being and systemic-wide security. Indeed,
the evolution toward a systemic-level perspective on security may
result in a state of affairs where the issuance of a nuclear threat
or even the contemplation of an attack using weapons of mass
destruction would be unheard of.
To effect such changes in the concept of national security is
a tall order. However, there have been cases in history where
government policy has been changed to reflect systemic rather than
national interests because of an enlightened public's concern
about issues important to global survival (examples are the
conclusion of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the
Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and the INF Treaty in 1987).
Therefore, one force which could effect a change toward a systemic
security perspective is an informed and determined public. To pin
our hopes for change on the prospect of a tidal change in world
public opinion is not entirely utopian because mounting evidence
indicates that a deep sea-change in world opinion is actually
taking place. The evidence that leaders are replying to - indeed,
are being carried along on a world-wide wave of desire for
security through peace - is seen in the dismantlement of the
Berlin Wall; the changes in Eastern Europe; the withdrawal of
troops from Afghanistan; the elections in Nicaragua, Namibia and
Eastern Europe; the release of Nelson Mandela; the superpowers'
agreement to eliminate chemical weapons as well as the growing
movement to negotiate large-scale cuts in carbon monoxide
emissions. But if there is not, ultimately, an even greater shift
toward more globally-oriented security concerns in the future,
including a move to create more security regimes, security
communities, security complexes and associations based on common
security, then the game of international relations runs the risk
of becoming a "negative-sum" game in which all nations and all
individual citizens feel less and less secure.
Conclusion
In order to reach a better understanding of the concept of
security and so as to suggest some strategies which could more
effectively enhance security, the differences between individual,
national and systemic-level approaches to security have been
considered. It was argued that the focus at the individual level of
analysis on individual physical security and on objectively and
subjectively-defined concepts of security could be broadened by
attention to individual insecurities and the methods and strategies
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Notes
1.

Arnold Wolfers Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, 1962),
p.147.

2.

For a more elaborate explanation of the problems surrounding
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purpose of nuclear retaliation.
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Peacefui-anversion:

A Training Centre for Peacekeepers
Across Canada several
communities are facing the
closure of nearby military
bases. In Nova Scotia consultants Peter Langilie and
Erika V. Simpson developed the following proposal
to convert CFB Cornwallis
to a training centre for UN
peacekeepers.
ver the past four decades, Cana-

O

dian governments have earned considerable respect, both at home and
abroad, for maintaining an exemplary
commitment to the United Nations and
multinational peacekeeping. The award
of the Nobel prize to both Prime Minister
Pearson in 1956 and to UN peacekeepers
in 1988 signifies the sincere appreciation
of the international community. It can be
argued that peacekeeping has been the
least expensive and yet also the most high
profile commitment of the Canadian
Armed Forces. Canada's Chief of Defence
Staff, General de Chastelain,
acknowledges that peacekeeping is viewed
by most Canadians as the raison d'etre of
our defence effort. Professor Albert
Legault, a Canadian defence analyst, also
notes that in a 31-one year period
between 1949 and 1980, the non-recoverable cost to Canada for our participation in peacekeeping operations was
$266 million dollars, approximately 0.4
percent of the total defence budget in that
period. In short, this relatively minor
investment has brought Canada remarkable international credit.
A renaissance of interest in both the
United Natio* and multinational
peacekeeping operations has accompanied
the end of the Cold War. Several
longstanding conflicts are slowly being resolved and there are now greater prospects that peacemaking will follow from
peacekeeping. Whereas most analysts
concur that there is a low probability of
being involved in a major conventional
war in the near future, there is a high likelihood Canada will be involved in a wide
range of future peacekeeping operations.
Canada's past Chief of Defence Staff,
General Paul Manson, acknowledges that
the demand for Canadian

peacekeeping expertise is likely to
continue. He writes:
With their reputation and experience, the Canadian forces will surely
be able to make an important contribution to international stability
through peacekeeping in the coming
years. For this effort to be most effective, however, Canada should work
with her peacekeeping partners and
the United Nations to develop new
and better ways to keep the peace in a
changing world. (Canadian Defence
Quarterly, Summer 1989)
Recent peacekeeping experiences have
demanded innovation and entailed new
tasks in areas such as election-monitoring,
verification, policing and the provision of
humanitarian assistance. In the aftermath
of the Gulf war, serious consideration is
being accorded to expanding the scope of
operations to include preventive
peacekeeping, maritime peacekeeping as
well as the collective security enforcement
operations that were initially envisaged
under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter.
Security Council members have
submitted proposals for the development
of rapidly deployable stand-by forces.
Last year, the UN Secretary General
appealed to member states to identify
troops and material that can in principle
be made available to the UN through
regional co-operation and burdensharing. In May 1991, Parliamentarians
for Global Action also called on gov

emments to set up UN peacekeeping
training centres in each region of the
world.
The international community is beginning to respond. For example, the Netherlands recently made a commitment to
allocate air, land and naval forces to future UN missions. The Scandinavian
countries have already established four
peacekeeping training centres and arranged cost-saving areas of specialization.

C

anada's involvement in nearly every
UN peacekeeping mission to date has
provided considerable experience and
expertise in areas such as communications
and logistics. Yet insufficient attention has
been devoted to consolidating, buildingupon or sharing this knowledge. Although
there are numerous combat training
facilities in Canada, we have yet to develop
a peacekeeping training centre. In fact,
there is no on-going or institutionalized
peacekeeping training programme in
Canada.
In the opinion of several internationally-acknowledged experts, Canada's
peacekeeping training programme has
been neglected. With an institutional bias
toward acquiring combat training and
equipment, there has been a reluctance to
devote scarce resources or a facility to
train for peacekeeping. Brigadier-General Clay Beattie (mt.) credits Canada
with having great experience and expertise in peacekeeping but as he says, "with

A Canadian Forces helicopter In UN service in Central America: Six nations mere
involved. (UN Photo)

,., challenges and tasks, there is
-a to be done to improve our training
programme. We can meet the new
challenges if we are better structured and
more formally prepared. A number of
crucial areas now deserve special attention."
Now, in the event of a peacekeeping
posting, a one-to-two week programme of
briefings and seminar instruction is
usually all that supplements regular training. More specialized training in the important areas of conflict resolution and
negotiation is neglected. Canadian experts
in this field acknowledge that there are
problems and risks in deploying
peacekeepers who have not been provided with adequate information regarding their posting, the foreign culture, the
political climate or with basic language
training. This ad hoc and reactive approach to preparation is difficult to understand when there are currently 1,926
Canadian armed forces personnel deployed to 10 UN peacekeeping operations.
As former Chief of Defence Staff,
Admiral Robert Falls, acknowledges, "if
Canada is going to be in the peacekeeping
business, it ought to be training people
adequately for the job."
The objectivei of a peacekeeping
training centre are straightforward: it
would facilitate the development of standardized training and operational procedures and it would ensure that the necessary expertise and forces were readily
available. In turn, it would serve to enhance the planning and safe management
of future operations. Lieutenant Colonel
Christian Harleman, a former
Commander of the Swedish UN Training
centre, writes that the purpose of their
training programme is "to give individuals and units a wider specialized
knowledge of their various fields and to
acquaint them with current security, political, cultural, religious and ethical conditions in those places of the world where
they will be called upon to serve."
The development of a peacekeeping
training centre would make it possible to
conduct operational training for officers,
civilians, and for complete military units
in their peacekeeping roles. With the benefit of advance training, Canadian forces
could be much more rapidly mobilized
and deployed to a theatre of operation.
A Canadian peacekeeping training
centre would also offer the opportunity to
host a larger multinational training
programme. The co-ordination and cooperation required in multinational operations could be pre-planned and rehearsed in joint exercises and simulations
PLOUGHSHARES MONITOR

conducted on the base and in the surrounding communities. Brigadier General William Yost (ret.), Director of the
Conference of Defence Associations, acknowledges that Canada has a lot to contribute to teaching other armed forces
about peacekeeping and in this respect
"we shouldn't hide our light under a
bushel".

A

number of intemationally-recogs
experts now recommend the
development of a Canadian centre that
could also host a multinational
peacekeeping training programme. General Indar.fit Rikhye emphasizes, "such a
training centre should not only be for Canadians, who are invited to almost all missions, but for other countries, especially
those who lack the ability and resources to
organize such a training establishment"
Lt. Colonel Christian Harleman,

Canada has a lot to contribute to teaching others
about peacekeeping.
Director of Peacekeeping Operations at
the International Peace Academy, also
recognizes Canada's extensive experience in this field and suggests that it is
time to support other countries with
this knowledge and understanding of
peacekeeping. As well, Sir Brian
Urquhart, a former Under-Secretary
General of the United Nations, states:
[A Canadian peacekeeping training
centre] could be extremely beneficial
not only to Canada's participation in
peacekeeping operations but also to a
number of neighbouring countries.
Existence of such a training centre
for the countries of the Western
hemisphere could be a great advantage at a time when there is going to
be increasing demand for peacekeeping contingents from a far wider
range of countries than hitherto.
With an identified training centre and
ear-marked forces, Canada would also
be well positioned to host one of the first
UN stand-by forces. As the Honourable
Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State
for External Affairs, recently stated, "the
other major lesson of the Gulf War is
that if we strengthen the capacity of the
UN to respond to breaches of security
more effectively, in the future, we shall
render such breaches less likely."
23
Joint funding arrangements for multi-

national training could be negotiated
through the Canadian Government's Military Training and Assistance Programme (MTAP). At a minimum, participating member states would have to be
responsible for providing return
transportation and salaries to their
respective contingents. Indeed, Canada
could develop such a centre and
programme without great expense.

C

FB Cornwallis is virtually unique in
already having facilities for this
type of training. As a longstanding school
for basic training, it includes an array of
residences, administrative offices,
training halls, drill areas, classrooms and
recreational centres. Given the recent
decision to reduce recruit enrolment at
Cornwallis by 56 percent, there will be
ample space and facilities for a
peacekeeping training centre.
Situated on the Annapolis Basin,
Cornwallis provides easy access to a
range of resources and terrain. In addition to the 615-acre-base, there is a 3000acre site 10 miles away in Granville that
currently accommodates a firing range.
Air transport is presently available
within 50 miles at CFB Greenwood. An
underutilized airfield near Digby is
within 10 miles. The Annapolis Basin and
nearby Bay of Fundy would also provide
a challenging environment for future
maritime peacekeeping training. In
addition, Cornwallis has an ideal geostrategic location for rapid deployment to
operations'in the Middle East, Central
America, Eastern Europe, and Africa.
Over the past 400 years, the surrounding Annapolis community has suffered
numerous violent conflicts, changing
hands on seven occasions in the struggle
to establish control over North America.
From these conflicts a new country
emerged — Canada a nation that has
since set numerous international precedents in its commitment to promote
peace and security.
The prospect of accommodating a
peacekeeping training centre would be
appealing to the local community, the
larger Annapolis Valley region and the
province of Nova Scotia. This is a common security initiative with obvious advantages to all related parties. As a clear
commitment to regional development
and constructive internationalism, the
decision to develop a peacekeeping
training centre at CFB Cornwallis would
receive widespread popular and political
support. •
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“Canada’s NATO Commitment:
Current Controversies, Past Debates, and Future Issues”
Erika Simpson
Introduction
Canada has been a committed member of NATO since its founding in 1949. It has
been one of Canada’s most controversial commitments—as evidenced by the recent
debate about NATO enlargement and the controversy over NATO’s bombing of Kosovo
and Serbia. In fact, we can probably expect yet another debate about Canada’s
commitment to NATO later this year as Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy has promised
to question the Alliance’s continued reliance on nuclear deterrence. There is also bound to
be future dissension over whether the allies should undertake a ‘second round of
expansion’, taking in countries like Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. While issues related to
NATO expansion and the war in Kosovo have dominated the news lately, it is also useful
to stand back and look at Canada’s overall relationship to NATO. This essay surveys some
current controversies, past debates, and possible future issues related to Canada’s NATO
involvement since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War.

Current Controversies
Expanding NATO Membership could be Risky

1

Last spring, before the war in Kosovo, NATO was preparing for its fiftieth
anniversary celebration in April. The plans were to have a big party in Washington,
Celine Dion was to sing, and NATO jet fighters were to fly in formation overhead. One
achievement the allies wanted to celebrate was NATO’s expansion from 16 to 19
members, taking in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the first round of NATO
enlargement.
NATO expansion had been vigorously opposed by the Russians—every political
party in Russia was opposed—but at the last moment President Boris Yeltsin agreed not
to forcefully oppose NATO’s enlargement. Yet the issue still raised a great deal of
controversy. Expansion was seen by some as a fall-back to regional alliance formations
and balance of power politics. There were fears it represented a reversal back to the
policy of containment, to the focus on military force, to collective defence, and possibly
extended deterrence. Others viewed expansion as a challenge to current efforts, under
the United Nations (UN) for example, to coordinate security at lower levels of defence
expenditure. In many respects, the issue of expansion raised other questions about
priorities and preferences–should we expand a regional collective defence organisation,
possibly at the expense of efforts to reform a universal collective security organisation,
like the UN?
There were others who wrote about the possibility that NATO expansion could
risk another security dilemma, that efforts NATO made to increase its security could
lessen Russia’s sense of security, leading possibly to greater tensions, and possibly
military competition—to another arms race in a divided Europe. Others argued that the
West was being short-sighted. We—that is the West—were urging Russia to undertake
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onerous democratic and market reforms in a difficult period of transition. At the same
time, NATO expansion would provide Russian nationalists with another excuse to turn
back the clock, and reverse reforms.
Despite these criticisms, plans were made for NATO to expand in any case. But
the big party last April was cancelled in favour of a quiet meeting about what to do about
the crisis in Kosovo. The black ties and tuxedos were never unpacked.
Now that the first round of expansion has taken place, NATO policy-makers must
forge a consensus among 19 allies—as NATO officially runs by consensus, not majority
vote—to decide who will be accepted in the ‘second round’. There will still be risks that
expansion, the first or the promised second round, could lead Russia to eventually move
some of its conventional or nuclear arsenal into defensive positions along a newlydefined border, along a new Central Front.
We also do not know which countries to invite into NATO during the second
round. Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, and Bulgaria want
membership. NATO policy-makers are merely uttering ambiguous phrases right now,
such as ‘the door is open’ to NATO expansion. Their reluctance stems, in part, from
concerns about the risk of undermining the credibility of NATO’s article 5. I call article 5
‘the three Musketeers’ article. It guarantees that an attack against one is an attack against
all. This is by far the most important article in NATO’s founding treaty. For example,
during the Kosovo debate, the fact that Serbia’s President had not actually attacked a
NATO ally was raised as a salient issue. Technically, Mr. Slobodan Milosovic had not
violated article 5. This important article raises other troubling questions. For instance, if
Hungary, now a NATO ally, is drawn into a war with Romania over Transylvania, an
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area over which they have argued for centuries, are we automatically involved? Both
countries made a great effort to patch up their differences in order to be invited into the
NATO club. But a few years or decades from now, if they fall into an armed conflict (just
as Greece and Turkey—NATO allies—have done), would we be left in a quandary about
our article 5 commitment?
It is fair to say that NATO expansion posed, and will continue to pose, a daunting
challenge and commitment; one that is not entirely risk–free.

The War in Yugoslavia and the Debate at Home:
Most recently, the Canadian government’s strong support of NATO’s actions in
Serbia and Kosovo during the war seemed to many to be proof of the country’s loyalty
to the Alliance. For example, the fact that the Canadian government, along with most of
the other allies, did not publicly raise doubts and reservations about the decision to bomb
Serbia and Kosovo was presented by the United States Information Agency as proof of
these countries’ basic allegiance to NATO .1
However, the bombing did incite substantial public discussion about the role
Canada should take in NATO’s management of the crisis in Kosovo and Serbia. It also
prompted fears about the measure of Canada’s NATO obligations in case the war spilled
over into the rest of the Balkans. During the crisis in Kosovo, concerns were voiced about
whether Canada should condone bombing a sovereign country that had not attacked any
member of the Alliance, and that was technically out of NATO’s territory of
responsibility. That CF-18 Canadian fighter planes were sent to assist with the aerial
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bombing of Serbia and Kosovo prompted debate over whether air strikes were necessary
or morally unjustifiable.2
Considerable controversy also arose over the prospect of contributing ground
forces to Kosovo. Many radio hot-line shows burned up the airwaves on this issue, and
the question of whether we should take in refugees. The Defence Department housed
thousands of refugees, temporarily, at various Canadian Forces bases. Not surprisingly,
the possibility of a ground war in the former Yugoslavia incited a great deal ofdebate
across the country and in the media.
While it is not yet known whether the federal cabinet was internally divided
about all these sorts of questions, certain comments by Lloyd Axworthy indicate that, as
Foreign Minister, he harboured reservations about unequivocally supporting NATO’s
actions in the Balkans.3 Put simply, the war served to remind Canadians that NATO
membership entails obligations and commitments that might be difficult to sustain.
As a NATO member, Canada has been a committed contributor to this
international organization, and governments have wanted to remain constructively
engaged for fifty years. But just ask anyone within a relationship and they can tell you
that any commitment entails obligations—challenging obligations that may be
comforting at times, while very trying at others—sometimes even grounds for separation
in more demanding circumstances. It is worth reflecting on how Canada has managed its
relationship with NATO since the end of the Cold War.4

Debates since the End of the Cold War
Challenge and Commitment:

5

The Mulroney government's 1987 Defence White Paper, was called “Challenge
and Commitment,” or sometimes rather derisively the ‘coffee table white paper’ because
of its many colour photographs. In 1987 the Defence Department promised a significant
increase in defence spending—because of, ostensibly, the challenge from the Soviet
Union—and it promised to strengthen Canada's NATO commitments. Specifically, the
government intended to acquire a fleet of 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines at a cost of
10-12 billion dollars. It wanted to double our troop strength in Europe and modernise
our equipment on NATO’s Central Front for high-intensity warfare. Basically, the
government committed to spend 183 billion dollars on defence over the next fifteen
years until the year 2002. It was a very expensive package for countering the primary
threat of the Cold War.
Then a couple of years later, in 1989, the Conservatives suddenly announced an
abrupt change in defence policy, freezing defence spending. They cutback major
capital expenditures. The nuclear submarines were cancelled, as well as new main
battle tanks, and plans to deploy a division in Europe. It was evident, to almost
everyone, that the nature of the threat from the Soviet Union—the challenge—had
changed. We no longer had to, or could, devote so much money and resources toward
improving our collective defence, particularly our NATO commitments.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and the Persian Gulf War in
the winter of 1991, Canadians continued to debate whether there was any reason for
Canada to retain its NATO commitments, especially its expensive troop commitment in
Europe. The government spent approximately 1 billion dollars a year merely to maintain
our troops in Europe—and that did not include the cost of training and equipping the rest
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of the Armed Forces, which were also structured primarily for big-league NATO roles,
including war in Europe, with all the related costs of equipment, training and supply.

Withdrawal from the Central Front in Germany:
The government's September 1991 announcement of its intention to withdraw all
but 1200 troops from the Central Front in Germany came as no great surprise. It was
estimated that a gradual withdrawal would result in financial savings of some 1.2 billion
dollars over five years. Then in February 1992, the Minister of Finance announced plans
to withdraw Canada's contingent from Europe completely. The members of the Canadian
delegation were given only a few hours’ notice of the change in policy. Initially the
decision was difficult for them to justify, especially since Prime Minister Mulroney had
only a few months before assured Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany that Canada
intended to retain a visible military presence on European soil. The European allies and
the American military representatives at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE) sharply criticised the timing of Canada's decision, particularly as it was taken
without consulting the other allies through proper channels.5
On the other hand, Canadian delegates to NATO and SHAPE in Brussels
consoled themselves by pointing to the significant role Canada's Ambassador to NATO
was playing in establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). They also
lauded Canada's commitment to European security through its peacekeeping efforts in the
former Yugoslavia.6

Canadian Efforts to Promote NACC and Peacekeeping
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The idea of according former Warsaw Pact nations associate membership in
NATO had been broached by Prime Minister Mulroney in 1991. When the possibility of
associate status was rejected—mainly by Britain and France because of the security
guarantee it entailed—the Canadian Ambassador to NATO worked to institute a form of
NATO membership for the Eastern Europeans under NACC auspices.7
The portrayal of Canada's contribution to the peacekeeping operation in
Yugoslavia as a renewed contribution to European security was also a source of
consolation to the Canadians in Brussels, whose efforts were assisted by the high mediaprofile of the Commander of the UN Forces, Canadian General Lewis Mackenzie.
Indeed, it was not long before Canadians at NATO headquarters were receiving requests
from the other allies, including Americans, for more information on peacekeeping. While
high-level representatives from allied countries such as Britain and Germany pointed out
that Canada's most valuable contribution to European security remained the maintenance
on European soil of troops ear-marked for NATO, in the early 1990s it seemed as if the
sudden shift of interest to peacekeeping might somehow brighten Canada's image at
NATO headquarters.8
Although Canada's status at NATO headquarters appeared to diminish with the
announcement of the troop withdrawal, the general attitude of the Canadian delegation
was one of resignation; indications were that the Canadian announcement was a precursor
to similar announcements of reductions and cut-backs among the other allies. It was clear
that Canada would remain an active participant in the North Atlantic Council, in the
hundreds of committees at NATO and SHAPE, and in the discussions surrounding the
implementation of the ‘New Strategic Concept.’ As NATO’s Secretary-General,
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Manfred Woerner, assured the allies in February 1992, after the announcement of
the troop withdrawal, Canada would meet its other commitments to NATO.9

Canada’s Continuing Alliance Commitments:
Despite the end of the Cold War, many of Canada's other NATO commitments
remained unchanged after the 1992 announcement. For instance, the nation retained the
capability to dispatch an expeditionary brigade group, two squadrons of CF-18s, and an air
defence battery to Europe. The government was responsible for maintaining a Canadian
Forces battalion prepared to deploy to Europe with the Allied Command Europe (ACE)
Mobile Force or the NATO Composite Force. Canadians continued to serve as part of the
NATO Airborne Early Warning (AEW) system in Geilenkirchen, Germany, and as aircrew
aboard NATO AEW aircraft. Canadian destroyers and frigates were prepared to sail with the
Standing Naval Force Atlantic while eleven destroyers and frigates, one supply ship, three
submarines, fourteen long-range patrol aircraft and twenty-five helicopters retained their role
in patrolling the North Atlantic as part of NATO's ‘augmentation’ forces. Canada was to do
its part to defend NATO's Canada-U.S. region a well as contribute to the North American
Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), which is responsible for the defence of NATO's
largest single land mass. Canada also offered the allied countries its facilities and territory for
military training, such as those at CFB Goose Bay in Labrador and CFB Shilo in Manitoba,
and the underwater naval testing range at Nanoose Bay in British Columbia.10
The Conservative government continued to demonstrate its support for NATO
through other means. The portion of the infrastructure budget at NATO headquarters paid
by Canada, although not widely known, was viewed at NATO headquarters as a significant
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contribution. The government's intention to retain approximately 650 Canadian personnel at
NATO and SHAPE as military planners, attachés, and representatives on the Canadian
delegation was also seen to be an important commitment. And the announcement regarding
the renewal of a ten-year contract to train approximately 6,000 German Armed Forces
annually at CFB Shilo and CFB Goose Bay was described as yet another example of
Canada's intention to help strengthen the Alliance. Although aboriginal residents
complained about the environmental effects of low-flying jets, and Goose Bay was slated to
be closed as the United States deemed it too expensive for training purposes, German and
other NATO planes continued to train at this base.11

The Chretien Government’s Defence Review:
In November 1993, the new Liberal government of Jean Chretien announced a
comprehensive review of Canadian defence policy, precipitating another debate about
Canada’s NATO commitments. By February 1994, a Special Joint Committee of the
Senate and House of Commons was established to initiate consultations and report to the
government. In testimony before the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence
Policy, some policy-makers continued to argue that the Alliance had to remain a priority
for both defence and foreign policy. They emphasised the wide array of new conflicts in
the world, particularly in Europe, the instability of the Russian leadership, and the
remaining military threat. They advised that the government ensure the country had
modern military equipment and sufficient tri-service personnel to fulfill the strategic
requirements of deterrence as well as NATO's New Strategic Concept. Canada, they
argued, must continue to structure and train its military for mid-to-high intensity combat
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operations. In testimony before the Special Joint Committee, they acceded that Canada
should contribute to United Nations' peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, but such
contributions should remain a low priority for the Canadian Forces relative to their
general combat capability for defending Canada and its allies. As some argued, the
alternatives posed a risk to security and stability as well as to Alliance relations. In their
opinion, NATO was adapting to this new environment of uncertainty, and NATO alone
retained the political coherence and military capabilities to ensure collective defence and
security.12
Others argued that NATO was now less a priority given the disintegration of the
Soviet military threat and the disappearance of both the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. They
noted the unlikelihood of an attack across Europe's Central Front, and frequently cited the
historic inability of military alliances to combat diffuse threats such as ethnic conflict,
environmental degradation, and human rights violations. Some suggested that Canada
should de-emphasize its military commitments to NATO while retaining a diplomatic and
consultative presence in the higher councils of the Alliance. Alternatively, many favoured
increasing Canada's foreign aid and contributions to UN agencies and operations. There
were also related proposals for new defence priorities that would emphasize the
monitoring and surveillance of Canadian territorial waters and air space as well as expand
the country's commitment to peacekeeping operations under UN auspices. Rather than
attempt to maintain a general-purpose, combat-capable army, navy, and air force, there
were calls for specialization. Accordingly, Canadian Forces should be restructured and
retrained in order to contribute more productively to peacekeeping and the various
initiatives outlined in the 1992 UN Agenda for Peace. Given this new
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environment, there would be unnecessary risks and expenses in adhering to the
prevailing assumptions, practices, and institutions of the past fifty years.13
In the midst of this defence review, the government announced its commitment
to the conversion of Canadian Forces Base Cornwallis in Nova Scotia into a
multinational training centre for UN and NATO-affiliated personnel. At the new Lester
B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, the government
planned to sponsor some training for military and civilian personnel from countries
participating in NATO's Partnership for Peace, as well as from developing countries
under Canada's Military Training Assistance Program. This decision provoked yet more
controversy about peacekeeping training and the advisability of establishing a privatized
peacekeeping training centre.14

NATO and the 1994 Defence White Paper
In December, the Department of National Defence released The 1994 Defence
White Paper, announcing that Canada would remain a full and active member of NATO.
The monolithic threat to Western Europe had disappeared, and the principal responsibility
for European defence lay with the Europeans, but at the same time, the government valued
the transatlantic link and recognised that the Alliance had made progress in adapting to a
post-Cold War world. The White Paper noted in particular those aspects of NATO that
reflected a cooperative approach to European security relations, including the creation of
NACC, Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the development of the Combined Joint Task
Force Concept. According to the White Paper, this perspective on NATO ‘underpinned’
the future of Canada's Alliance commitments. In the event of a
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crisis or war in Europe, the contingency forces Canada maintained for all multilateral
operations would immediately be made available to NATO.15 Yet for the first time, the
Defence Department consistently referred to Canada’s NATO defence commitments
after pointing out the country’s UN obligations. This seemed to herald a fundamental
reordering of Canada’s defence priorities.16

The Costs of NATO Enlargement:
Predictably, the release of this White Paper in 1994 did not terminate the debate
over the measure and extent of Canada's NATO commitments. Gradually some highlevel foreign and defence policy advisors became concerned about the costs of NATO
enlargement for Canada. Prime Minister Jean Chretien initially supported expanding
NATO membership from sixteen to twenty member states (adding Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, and Slovenia). However, estimates of the costs of enlargement tended to
vary widely, in part because of uncertainty about the number of new members that
should be admitted. Nevertheless, in 1997 many high-level American officials agreed
that NATO expansion would cost somewhere between US$27 billion and US$35 billion
over the next 13 years. Would Canada’s defence costs jump with NATO enlargement?
Behind-the-scenes, some senior policy-makers worried about the looming costs of
NATO expansion in the twenty-first century, and about the extent to which Canada
should or could support the rebuilding of the newer allies’ defence systems. In the weeks
prior to ratification of the enlargement decision in the United States Congress, the US
State Department concurred with NATO’s revised assessment that enlargement could
cost only $1.5 billion rather than $27-35 billion. Yet these wide variations in estimates
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among such reputable analysts as the United States Congressional Budget Office, the
Pentagon, the State Department, and NATO headquarters raised more questions about the
measure of Canada’s NATO commitments, and about whether all these estimates might
prove to be low. Even as the Alliance opened the door to the first round of expansion,
many Canadians worried about the potential cost of Canada’s NATO obligations.17

Future Issues
NATO’s Nuclear Strategy and the Middle Powers Initiative:
One issue that promises to incite further controversy revolves around Canada’s
critique of NATO’s reliance upon nuclear deterrence strategy. The NATO Summit in
Washington last April opened the door to a broad-ranging review of NATO’s nuclear
weapons policy. NATO’s New Strategic Concept, which since 1991 has reaffirmed the
Alliance’s commitment to relying upon nuclear weapons, will be reviewed and reexamined. Pressure from the leaders of the Middle Powers Initiative and the NonNuclear Weapon States, particularly from key policy-makers in Canada, Germany,
Sweden, Norway, and Japan, may result in a serious review of the Strategic Concept. In
particular, key policy-makers from the Middle Powers Initiative could influence NATO’s
decision-making regarding its nuclear commitments, leading to important and subtle
shifts in the Alliance’s deterrence strategy over the period between 2000-2002.
The issue that NATO has promised to review is of historical, practical, as well as
theoretical interest. After fifty years of relying upon nuclear weapons for our defence,
recent developments, including the end of the Cold War, have presented an opportunity
to enter the new millennium with a plan for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Many
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distinguished world figures are arguing that the risk of retaining nuclear arsenals in
perpetuity far outweighs any possible benefit imputed to nuclear deterrence. They
believe that the end of the Cold War has created a new climate for international action to
eliminate nuclear weapons, an opportunity that must be exploited quickly or it will be
lost. They see the Middle Powers Initiative as a bold attempt to encourage NATO
leaders to ‘break free from their Cold War mindsets’ and move rapidly to a nuclear
weapon-free world.
Hundreds of international and nongovernmental organisations have focused on
abolishing nuclear weapons, and to buttress this grassroots effort the Middle Powers
Initiative was launched in 1998. Countries without nuclear weapons coalesced and are
now lobbying the nuclear-armed nations to disarm themselves. Canadian Senator
Douglas Roche is the chairman of the Middle Powers Initiative, and joining Canada as
members are other non-nuclear weapon states, such as Germany, Norway, Sweden,
Japan, and Mexico. Whereas NATO’s Strategic Concept has hardly changed on the issue
of maintaining reliance upon nuclear weapons since 1991, the Washington Summit
Communiqué, issued by NATO heads on April 24, 1999, committed NATO to ‘review’
its strategic policy. At a news conference on April 24, Foreign Minister Axworthy
confirmed the willingness of NATO “to have a review initiated” of its nuclear weapons
policies. Explaining that this was the thrust of the recommendations that came out of the
report of Canada’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Axworthy added: “It’s a message that
the [Canadian] Prime Minister took [to] certain NATO leaders... I think we have now
gained an acknowledgement that such a review would be appropriate and that there

15

would be directions to the NATO Council to start the mechanics of bringing that
about.”18
This gives the non-nuclear weapon states in NATO, and the 12 abstainers on the New
Agenda Coalition’s 1998 resolution at the UN, a new opportunity to press for a ‘quality
review’, not a perfunctory one. Members of the Middle Powers Initiative, headed by
Senator Roche, believe that the NATO communiqué strengthens the possibility that
appropriate representations can be made to a number of important countries around the
world. Indeed, it was Canada, in its official policy statement, that urged NATO to begin a
nuclear weapons review, and this was carried into the NATO Summit. Members of the
Middle Powers Initiative are expected to press for further changes to NATO’s deterrence
strategy in the near future.19 Success will depend on whether a new coalition of leaders
from countries respected by the Nuclear Weapon States—especially by the United
States—generates sufficient political momentum and media attention.

Conclusion
Canada’s policy record since the end of the Cold War indicates that we will
remain committed to NATO, but on somewhat different terms than before. One seldom
reaches the silver or golden anniversary in any relationship without experiencing doubts
and the occasional shift in terms of commitment. Still, as many concede, this has been a
relatively successful alliance over the last fifty years. The challenge for Canada, once
again, is to remain constructively engaged—to chart a safer course—and to ensure
NATO responds cost-effectively and responsibly. Canada must remind the other NATO
allies that some arguments, controversy, debate, and dissension can and should be
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expected in what is alleged to be a democratic relationship—indeed, they may
help improve this longstanding institution.
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Essays

New Threats to the Alliance's Security
and Strategies to Reform NATO
gy: Erika Simpson

N

ATO needs a much greater transformation of
its structures and procedures if it is to serve
the common security interests - of the allies
and others. Traditional policies should be seriously
reconsidered and perhaps drastically reevaluated. Old
ways of thinking no longer apply to the world in which
we live. This article suggests new types of threats to
allied security and proposes alternative strategies to
reform NATO so as to enhance international security.

CONDUCT INDEPENDENT THREAT ANALYSIS
For decades, NATO's assessment of threats has been shaped and
influenced by American military threat analysis. This development
was not considered a serious problem until recently. As George
Bush explained during the second presidential debate with John
Kerry: "We all thought there was weapons
there, Robin. My opponent thought there was
weapons there. That's why he called him a
grave threat. I wasn't happy when we found
out there wasn't weapons, and we've got an
intelligence group together to figure out
why."1 While Prime Minister Tony Blair has
been largely exonerated for taking American
intelligence at face value, many will not
accept this sort of backhanded logic in future
wars. In the future, domestic publics will
demand hard evidence of a country's
professed transgressions, even if American
politicians argue that such evidence exists but
cannot be released for security reasons. Some
of the lessons of the war against Iraq are that NATO allies need to
undertake more of their own independent military threat analysis.
They need to institute the infrastructure and procedures necessary to
carry out such independent threat analysis and share their findings.2
Erika Simpson is an associate professor of international relations
and international security in the Department of Political Science at
the University of Western Ontario (simpsonftwo.ca). She is the
author of many articles on NATO (available at httpapflublish.uwo.cat-simpsonl) and of the book, NATO and the Bomb
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001).

SHARE ALTERNATIVE THREAT ASSESSMENTS
AND INTELLIGENCE

In conjunction with United Nations monitoring agencies
and international watchdog institutes, NATO could
unite with like-minded nations to provide the UN
Security Council with timely and accurate threat assessments based on new information and possibly conflicting analysis of the threat. Such alternative threat assessments could play a valuable role in reducing tensions
and defusing arms spirals in the weeks and months preceding possible multilateral or unilateral actions (such
as air strikes).
Naturally, critics will retort that sharing intelligence,
especially contrary evidence on the nature of the threat,
will not necessarily prevent the US administration from
undertaking preemptive or unilateralist measures. For
many American diplomats, the lessons of the Kosovo

campaign in 1999 and the Franco-German rebuff in 2003
reinforced their belief that NATO is far too cumbersome
and bureaucratic. Now that targets have to be approved
by 26 members, "coalitions of coalitions" 3 may seem
more practical, as exemplified by the United States'
,
'coalition of the willing" in Iraq. Even if one or more of
the non-US NATO allies puts forward contradictory
evidence about the nature of the threat, the US and
members of its "fast alliance" may choose not to accept
such evidence. A great deal will depend on the quality of
the intelligence and in this respect, France, Germany, and
the UK could have a lot to offer. NATO headquarters
should inculcate a culture where competing
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interpretations of threats are encouraged among the
twenty-six allies.

PROMOTE AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONCILIATION
THROUGH NATO
Admittedly, fostering an atmosphere of conciliation and
acceptance may take a long time. As the Ditchley
Foundation concluded in a recent discussion of NATO's
future role: "Whatever the underlying causes, most of us
agreed that this level of transatlantic insult had not been
seen before and that it had contributed to an unnecessary
crisis, the effects of which would be with us for some
time. There was a good deal of broken crockery about." 4
During the presidential debates, John Kerry appealed to
American citizens to vote for him, stating "I believe
America is safest and strongest when we are leading the
world and we are leading strong alliances." 5 He
criticized George Bush for attacking Iraq too quickly
before ensuring a strong coalition was in place. In the
future, another important way to promote an atmosphere
of conciliation would be for the United States (and
Canada) to refrain from viewing threats to North
American security as markedly different from, and more
important, than threats to Europe.

The failure of the nuclear weapon
states to implement their NonProliferation Treaty obligations means
that many countries, like Iran and North
Korea, have the rationale they seek to
obtain nuclear arsenals of their own.
DECLINE PARTICIPATION THROUGH NORAD IN
SPACE-BASED PROGRAMMES
After the Cold War's end, the decline of the Soviet threat
meant that the North American Aerospace Defence
Command (NORAD) was no longer as important to North
American security. But now some argue that preparing
for possible warfare in space is necessary, and the US
(possibly in conjunction with Canada) should work
through NORAD to develop space-based interception
capabilities. In Europe and Canada, concerns have long
been raised about possible contributions to the US
military's global surveillance, warning, and
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communications systems. As one observer has pointed
out, the American government needs to be especially
careful that it is not perceived to be intent upon erecting
some kind of "Fortress America." 6 Accordingly, NATO
governments should maintain official positions of nonparticipation in the US missile and space-based defence
programme because it is not configured in a manner
consistent with international disarmament and proliferation interests and the prevention of weaponization of
space. In addition, the allies should organize preliminary
discussions on the contents of a treaty on the prevention
of an arms race in space. Such a treaty could build on the
longstanding commitment of most of the world's states to
the basic tenets of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(although the Bush and Putin administrations chose to
abandon the ABM Treaty). Of course, US government
participation in such discussions is unlikely at present,
but many states with space capabilities might participate.
And if discussions were organized to ensure
representation by non-governmental entities, including
corporate space interests, US corporations with an interest in non-weaponized space might participate. Such
discussions could set the groundwork for actual treaty
negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament or elsewhere when conditions for progress are more propitious. 7

SAVE THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY (NPT) FROM CHARGES OF HYPOCRISY
The failure of the nuclear weapon states to implement
their NPT obligations under Article VI of the NPT
means many countries, like Iran and North Korea, have
the rationale they seek to obtain nuclear arsenals of
their own. As a result, the upcoming "Third Review
Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty" (RevCon)
faces daunting challenges. The original nuclear
weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France, and China)
have not lived up to their obligations under Article VI
of the NPT to move decisively toward the irreversible
elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Such inaction
"invites charges of hypocrisy when these same
countries seek to deny access to nuclear technologies to
nonnuclear weapons states - and moreover, threaten and
carry out military preemption to prevent the acquisition
of nuclear weapons by other countries as in the case of
the US and UK concerning Iraq." 8
Prior to the NPT's Preparatory Committee (PrepCom)
meeting at the UN in 2004, the Middle Powers Initiative
(MPI) and Pugwash Canada sponsored a roundtable for

New Threats to the Alliance's Security and Strategies to Reform NATO
Canadian officials and NGO representatives. The paper Building Bridges: The NonProliferation Treaty and Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies is based on this event. It
recommended building bridges between NATO member states and those of the New
Agenda Coalition, which focuses on nuclear disarmament. The aim is to strengthen the
"moderate middle" ofthe nucleardebate. Itdiscussedbuildinga bridge betweenthe nuclearweapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states to .)pen the road to substantive
disarmament and non-pro:feration progress. It also made recommendations regarding
Canada's role and responsibilities with respect to the US ballistic missile defence project and
Tossibleweaponizationofspace.9

MAINTAIN LOW LEVELS OF DEFENCE SPENDING
The European allies in NATO and Canada have made laudable efforts to decrease
their defence spending. Since 2001, the non-US NATO members' spending on
NATO has been less than 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Over the last
three years, however, the United States has laid out 3.6 percent of its GDP on its
defence commitments worldwide. Canada expended 1.2 percent, approximately the
same percentage as Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
and Spain. The Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Turkey, and the UK
ranked at or above this average. All other NATO members fell below this average
highlighting the fact that American remonstrations to spend more are failing to
convince.12

Hight NATO states calling for more speed in implementing commitments to the NPT supported a New Agenda Coalition resolution 3t the
UN. They built a bridge on he long road to nuclear disarmament. The
bridge gained extra trength when Japan and
For example, Germany is making drastic cuts in
South Korea joined with the NATO 8 - Big-ticket costly weapons equipment and slimming down its organizational
Belgium, Canada, Germany, Lithuania,
structures; its focus has switched to peacekeeping,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway and systems are unlikely to find crisis management, and the war against terrorism,
Turkey. These states, along with the New
rather than defending itself from Cold War attacks.
bin Laden or Similarly, Canada has refrained from markedly
Agenda countries Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Osama
Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and
increasing its defence spending on capital and
prevent a terrorist attack.
equipment in favour of a modest increase to the
Sweden - now form an impressive centre in
the nuclear weapons debate and can play a
number of available peacekeepers. Even US
determining role in the outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference.10
Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld acknowledges that big-ticket costly weapons
systems are unlikely to find Osama bin Laden or prevent a terrorist attack. When US
Lust as Canada and Germany took the lead in NATO army officials expressed confidence that they would capture bin Laden in 2004, "they
by asking the Alliance to review its reliance on cited better intelligence - not powerful new arms - as the basis for their optimism."13
deterrence, the non-nuclear weapon states in NATO, Increasing defence spending to American levels is not an option for responsible pollthe New Agenda Coalition, and the Middle Powers cymakers.
Initiative will play a significant role. Seven NATO
states have - wined with Canada, which for two years Although some European and Canadian defence lobbyhad stood alone in NATO in supporting the New ists bemoan lower levels of defence spending, domestic
Agenda resolution. The fact that such important NATO publics will not tolerate higher levels. The newer allies
players as Germany, Norway, The Netherlands and will have a tough time coming up with the money to
Belgium have also now taken a proactive stance bring their militaries up to NATO's basic standards of
indicates that they want to send a message to the US to interoperability. In the biggest defence contract by a fortake more significant steps to fulfilling commitments mer Soviet bloc country since the end of the Cold War,
already made to the NPT. As retired Canadian Senator Poland agreed to buy 48 US-made F-16 jet fighters for
Douglas Roche, thair of the MPI states, "The situation US$3.5 billion. Such modernization will cost Poland
the NPT finds itself in is so serious and the threat of about $7.76 billion through 2012. Like Poland, all the
nuclear terrorism -9 3 real that governments need to put new allies are facing steep modernization costs to
aside their quarto& and power plays and take replace obsolete or inadequate equipment. But the target
meaningful steps to ensure that the NPT will not be force goals they agreed to with NATO prior to joining
lost to the world dough erosion." 11
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the Alliance are proving difficult to reach. 14 (Those
goals, outlining the contribution to the Alliance that
each member intends to make, are classified by NATO).

CALCULATE DEFENCE SPENDING FAIRLY
In forthcoming analysis of the allies' abilities to meet an agreed-on set
of pledges related to their capabilities, the "Prague Capabilities
Commitments," the NATO countries need to consider alternative sorts
of commitments-such as UN and NATO-sponsored peacekeeping
because they improve the Alliance's military preparedness and close
the spending gap between the US and
its European allies. Even the EU's
efforts to field a rapid-reaction force of
60,000 personnel should count as a
monetary contribution to NATO's
security. After all, the United States
calculates the percentage of GDP
spent on NATO incorporating all US
defence spending worldwide including US spending in the Middle
East on defence and American foreign
military assistance to Columbia. It
makes sense to reply to American
concerns about burden-sharing by
asking NATO officials to calculate
spending estimates on all types of
defence expenditures, particularly
NATO Secretary
peacekeeping under NATO and UN
and UN Se
auspices.

CONTRIBUTE MORE HEAVILY
TO PEACEKEEPING UNDER NATO AUSPICES
Most of the NATO allies, including the United States,
are participating more heavily in peacekeeping under
NATO auspices than in the past. Recent new NATO
missions include commanding the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan and assisting in
Poland's command of a NATO-supported peacekeeping
force in Iraq. NATO is also improving its ability to act
far beyond Europe and North America through a major
restructuring that includes cutbacks at NATO headquarters in Belgium and a stronger presence in the United
States. A command centre in Norfolk, VA, "Allied
Command
Transformation,"
is
overseeing
this

50

Winter/Spring 2005

modernization. More robust, rapidly deployable
capabilities will change NATO into a much more
nimble, deployable, action-oriented organization. The
most significant development has been the institution
of a 20,000-strong "NATO Response Force," ready to
deploy within days.
At the same time, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) is contributing 25,00032,000 alliance and non-alliance troops. And until mid-2003, the NATO-led
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina included about 13,000 NATO
and non-NATO troops. In June 2003, the forces were reduced to 7,000 and since
the end of 2004, the mission has been
transferred to the EU. Furthermore, NATO
members have been
patrolling
Mediterranean since the terrorist
attacks of 2001, a mission
called
Endeavour.
But the risk is that as NATO involves its
allies in more and more "out-ot-area"
operations similar to those in Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and now Iraq, the rest of the
world may come to perceive NATO
peacekeepers as defenders of the
American empire. As such, while NATO
should continue to increase its
General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
commitment to peacekeeping, there needs
cretary Generaf, Koti Annan - UN
to be a complementary return to the UN as
the chief guarantor of safety. This will help
to avoid the widespread perception that the "NATO club" consists mainly of
Northern, "rich," "white" nations based in North America and Europe.

RETURN TO THE UN WITH INCREASED FUNDING AND
CONTRIBUTIONS TO SHIRBRIG AND A FUTURE UN
EMERGENCY SERVICE
The UN continues to experience a funding crisis due to
member states' failure to honour their financial obligations. Member states of the UN invest an average of
$1.40 in UN peacekeeping activities for every $1,000
spent on their own armed forces. For example, for
every dollar that it has invested in UN peacekeeping,
the United States has tended to spend over $2,000 on
its own military.I 5 The NATO allies need to contribute
more money and personnel to UN peacekeeping or run

the
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the risk of being accused of trying to channel all actions
through NATO peacekeeping. One effective way to do
this would be to contribute standby forces and equipment to the UN's Standby High Readiness Brigade
(SHIRBRIG). Sixteen countries are members of the
brigade, which successfully monitored the ceasefire
between Eritrea and Ethiopia, but more contributors and
resources are needed. While SHIRBRIG aims to provide
the UN with a jump-start, rapid deployment force of as
many as 5,000 troops within 30 days notice, plans are

The risk is that as NATO involves its allies
in more and more "out-of-area" operations
similar to those in Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and now Iraq, the rest of the world may
come to perceive NATO peacekeepers as
defenders of the American empire.

lesson is that every NATO ally - not just the current
hegemon - now has a duty and responsibility to put
forward alternative proposals to enhance international
and national security. The foreign ministers of the
allied powers may not be able to summon fleets of
frigates in aid of their diplomacy or threaten to use
nuclear weapons, let alone decide to use them. But
they can carry briefcases stocked with practical
proposals and promises of more money to put toward
alternative strategies. Notes:
1.

'Transcript: second presidential debate," online:

http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004c.html.
2.

For a detatied analysis of NATO's progress-and lack of progress-on instituting new

infrastructure and procedures since 9/11, see Eric R. Terzuolo, "Regional Alliance, Global
Threat NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1994-2004," online:
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3.
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4.

The Ditchley Foundation's News and Conference Reports, Report by the Director,
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afoot to establish a UN Emergency Service (UNES). It
would be a UN 911 that could avert genocide and armed
conflict worldwide, not just in Sudan and Rwanda but in
all regions of the world, including NATO's backyard.
While NATO's new "Rapid Reaction Force" runs the risk
of being perceived as US-led and status quo oriented,
each participating state in SHIRBRIG would reserve the
right to decide whether to deploy national personnel on a
case-by-case basis. This would ensure that its final
composition would be wider and more inclusive.
Moreover, UNES would be composed of professional
volunteers, military police, and civilians working directly
for the UN. This would reduce the pressure on national
decision-making and the immediate demand for national
armed forces in UN peace operations. 16

5.

6.

NATO has limited time and a small window of oppor:unity to take advantage of its fairly benign reputation.
it is highly unlikely that this regional military alliance
rill be seen in such a positive light ten years from now.
Right now, NATO is well-situated to make the impor:ant changes proposed in this article because the NATO
allies did not acquiesce to American pressure to join the
war on Iraq. It was evident from France, Germany,
Belgium, and Canada's reluctance to join the war that
not everyone could agree on the best methods and most
efficient means of achieving commonly valued objec ±ves, including ousting Saddam Hussein. The important
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Middle Powers Can Do to Strengthen the NPT, is online: the Middle Powers Initiative
website: http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/pubs.htrnl. For further discussion of
NATO nuclear policy and attempts to modify it, see Erika Simpson, "NATO's
Nuclear Weapons Policy: relationships to the 2000 and 2005 NPT Review
Conferences, the paragraph 32 process and future Canadian policy," paper
presented to the CPG-MPI Roundtable, 27 February 2004, online: the Canadian
Pugwash Group website: http://www.pugwashgroup.ca.
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Here’s advice on how to get started

W

hen Erika Simpson
finished her PhD
dissertation in political
science at the University
of Toronto in 1995, she knew her
experience could help other graduate

Soon after, as a newly minted professor
teaching international relations in the
political science department of the
University of Western Ontario, she
realized that the lessons she learned
would be helpful to the graduate

suggestions from the graduate workshops for MA and PhD political science
students at Western and comments from
several colleagues, she wrote a
document of useful advice for would-be
thesis writers. It now serves as a

hand-out for all grad students in Western’s political science department (even
though it’s not “official departmental
policy”). Many of her observations are
also applicable to graduate students in
other departments, especially in the
social sciences.
This is a shortened version of Dr.
Simpson’s document. The original
version, including references, can be
found at http://publish.uwo.ca/~simpson/
publish/ on the Web.

W

hen embarking on a thesis, it’s
essential to choose a topic early
and give yourself plenty of time to do
your preliminary research. You’ll need
to scan the latest journals and books
related to your interests and search the
Internet to determine whether anyone
has already written extensively on your
topic, and who the main authors are in
your area. Also make sure you review at
least three other theses in your department’s collection or the university
library. Ask yourself how much theory
you want to incorporate into your thesis,
how widely relevant you want it to be,
and what potential employers might
want to see on your resumé.
In framing a research question, you
need to pin down exactly what it is you
want to find out, and what problem you
will examine. For example, if you are
interested in improving United Nations
peacekeeping efforts and you would like
to work for the UN, your question might
be: How has the UN financed its
peacekeeping operations?
Once you’ve done your early
research and framed a relevant question,
prepare a brief written statement for
your supervisor, defining concepts
where necessary. Think about whether
your research question can be further
narrowed down.
Outline the topic’s significance: Is
it timely? Does it relate to a practical
problem? Does it fill a research gap?
Does it relate to broader theoretical
principles or general theory? Does it
sharpen the definition of an important
concept or relationship? Does it have
implications for a wide range of
practical problems?
You’ll also need to establish
whether your question is related to a
theoretical problem, previous
theoretical research, or a debate in the
literature. Discuss whether you will

parts, whether you will make
theoretical propositions in the
introduction or discuss theoretical
implications in the conclusion, and
indicate whether you are writing a
theoretical and/or policy-relevant
thesis.
You may prefer an alternative
research methodology (for example, an
interpretive, critical, comparative, or
historical approach). But by at least
attempting to answer the following
questions, you should make significant
progress in designing your research
project. Moreover, you may encounter a
thesis examiner who wants to know
what your independent and dependent

Once your
topic
is chosen
and approved,
you need to
step up your
research
efforts, and
continue them
year-round,
not only in
the crucial
months before
the final
deadline.
variables are. Try to assert your propositions in the form of one-sentence
hypotheses. Now ask the hypotheses
in the form of questions. Do any of
your propositions overlap and can
any questions be eliminated? Do
they make common sense or are they
far-out and controversial?
Although you don’t need to use a
positivist explanation, you should think
about your possible independent,
intervening, and dependent variables. If
you want to explain the dependent

you suspect are the most significant
independent variables? Can you argue
that given A, you expect B will occur?
Are there exceptions? Can you narrow
your list of independent (and
intervening) variables to include only
those most significant? What evidence
could you turn up to prove or disprove
your propositions? What might lead
you to reject your propositions? What
levels of analysis will you study?
If you decide to use the case-study
approach, ask yourself whether your
case selection was biased, and
recognize that many theses end up with
fewer case studies than initially
planned. If the bulk of your evidence
comes from logical reasoning (for
example, game theory or rational
choice theory), determine what
counter-arguments seem to oppose or
contradict your reasoning. Or, if your
method is more historical or
interpretive, ask how much detailed
chronological explanation you need.
What scale will you use to measure
significant factors or variables (such as
quantitative, semi-quantitative,
qualitative)? Will you undertake the
kind of research necessary to measure
your variables (for example,
mathematical, survey, public opinion,
in-depth interviews, content analysis)?
Are any important concepts in need of
measurement (intensity, frequency,
amount, number)? How will you assess
the measure of change, significance or
importance?
YearYear-round research
Once your topic is chosen and
approved, you need to step up your
research efforts, and continue them
year-round, not only in the crucial
months before the final deadline.
Don’t be discouraged if, at the
beginning, you are overwhelmed by
too much information. Your most
highly relevant research may take
place in the weeks and months
leading up to the penultimate draft.
Remember that you are looking for
patterns and trends, and that you
must think about how you will
structure your analysis. Think about
all the alternative approaches you
could take, and be prepared to
defend your chosen method.
You are moving toward being able
to make theoretical and policy-relevant
conclusions, and you need to be

your research methodology. Ideally
they will be logical, and a new
contribution to knowledge. Be prepared
to advance a central argument or thesis
based on your research, and explain
how the evidence generally confirms or
refutes your initial suppositions. How
would you now qualify your research
propositions? Should you reword them
to be more accurate?
When it comes to the actual
writing, you can save time by working
on the main body of the thesis first and
leaving the introduction and conclusion
until the end. Remember that you can
repeat some introductory points in your
conclusion.
When you do finally write the
introduction and conclusion, consider
any mistakes you’ve made, and what
you would do differently now. Assess
your method of gathering information,
and ask yourself how would you
improve your research process. With
your supervisor, discuss how your
conclusions could be fed back into
theory. What are the theoretical
implications of your research?

During the
first year or
semester, read
as much as
possible. Don’t
be shy about
talking to your
supervisor.
Brainstorm.
Write down
ideas on file
cards. Throw
most of them
away. Follow
your hunches.
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In the conclusion, you may
mention what you intend to research in
the future, knowing what you know
now. In light of your work, indicate
areas that are ripe for further research.
While writing the conclusion, students
often tend to refine their arguments
and write excellent summaries.
Perhaps you could move some of this
material to the introduction, where it
might be more useful to the reader.
When at the final draft stage, every
section, paragraph, and sentence should
advance your overall argument. Excise
any sections that are there only because
you did the research, not because they are
necessary to your thesis.
Headings should explain and
reflect the table of contents. In the
abstract, state your argument clearly.
Tests and evidence should be
explained fully. Note the sources of all
your charts and graphs. Acknowledge
and address legitimate counterarguments. Summarize the debate of
which your thesis is a part, and specify
what previous literature it confirms or
revises.
Your thesis will be read by scholars
in your field; it may also by read by
non-specialists. It should be well
organized and clearly presented so that
readers may easily grasp the significant
points. Other graduate students and
friends can give useful advice before
you submit your thesis. Don’t assume
that any confusion is due to their
stupidity or ignorance, and instead
consider how you might constructively
use each criticism or suggestion.
The term “final draft” should mean
“the best I can do”. Read your drafts
carefully. Pages and footnotes or endnotes should be consistently numbered.
Your advisors will have suggestions, and
you should feel free to debate them. But
you have the final responsibility for
content, presentation and errors.
Common thesis problems During
the first year or semester, read as
much as possible. Don’t be shy about
talking to your supervisor.
Brainstorm. Write down ideas on file
cards. Throw most of them away.
Follow your hunches.
It’s crucial to learn how to search
for information using the Internet.
Update your bibliography as you
conduct your research, in the proper
format on your computer. You can

Write a draft once you have done
50 percent of your research. Then fit
your remaining research information
into your draft. Many people continue
to do research because they are afraid
of writing. Remember: You do not
have to read everything.
Decide which style to use – Modern
Language Association or American
Psychological Association, making sure
that your chosen style is acceptable by
the official thesis guideline issued by
your department. Be consistent, and
footnote your sources and bibliography
correctly from the beginning.
Err on the side of over-footnoting.
Study journal articles in your field to
assess when and what they footnote. Be
careful not to paraphrase someone’s
analysis and pass it off as your own. If
you have not provided evidence in the
main body of your writing to back up an
assertion, you can list in a footnote or
endnote the materials that would
buttress your argument. Statements of
fact should be properly documented.
Quotations and interviews need to be
properly noted. Frequently ask yourself
if you can footnote a comment rather
than retain it in the main text, to
eliminate confusion and save time.
When explaining a concept or
theory, such as post-modernism or
realism, do not use critics’
works. Cite original authors, not
someone else’s interpretation of
an original idea, and footnote the
original source.
Tackling the first draft
As you write the first draft, refrain
from editing and proofreading.
Considerable time can be wasted
editing on the computer. If you
dislike writing first drafts, take the
attitude, “I’m just going to bang out a
few pages”, and strive for at least
three pages a day. Remember to give
the reader signposts to indicate where
you are going. For instance, restate
your interpretation of the findings and
provide conclusions that summarize
preceding paragraphs. Use many
headings and sub-headings.
By the time you write the last
chapter, the first chapter will need
to be revised. This is not a disaster,
and is actually expected. In fact,
you will probably do many serious
revisions of your entire thesis.
Don’t be discouraged – you can get

Among
graduate
students, procrastination
is common and
expected, for
a variety
of reasons.
Your computer’s spellcheck will
not pick up all your errors so
carefully read your draft before
handing it to your professor. It is
usually better to be late than to
submit a poorly written or unedited
draft. You will be judged in part
based on the clarity of your writing
and the quality of your presentation.
Print your work frequently. Keep
copies of your disks and your drafts
in different locations just in case of
fire, tornadoes and earthquakes. For
peace of mind, save your work every
day. Solve any computer or printer
problems now, not when deadlines
loom.

Among graduate students, procrastination is common and expected,
for a variety of reasons. To combat
the problem, schedule rewards (such
as exercise) after completing X hours
of work. Study at the library with
others. Prioritize long-term and shortterm goals. Ask for more feedback
from your advisor. Set short-term
deadlines. Work when you will be
least bothered, and don’t socialize
during study times. Reward yourself
with lunch, coffee, a chat with a
friend. Ask yourself whether you are
overbooking your time because you
are afraid to work on your top
priority – your thesis! Just say NO!
Another common problem is
writer’s block. The way out of this
one is to write anything. Write
why you hate your research
project. Your inner critic is fond
of phrases such as: This is stupid!
You don’t know anything and you
should do more research! You
better go back and correct that
sentence! Tell your inner critic to
get lost. Then write as if you were
explaining your ideas to a friend
or a relative, someone who is not a
critic but a fan.
E-mail progress reports to
your supervisor if you cannot
drop by frequently. Vow to keep
in touch, especially if you are
having problems. UA•AU
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Thinking about Your Thesis?
Erika Simpson
Writing a MA thesis or PhD dissertation is a difficult and time-consuming endeavour.
Some students produce chapters based on sound research frameworks and methodology with
seemingly little effort or hands-on guidance. Most would-be scholars, however, struggle
valiantly. This guideline to thinking about the MA or PhD thesis is meant to act as a map or
compass—not a directive.1

A Set of Questions
The MA or PhD candidate might ponder the following set of questions before
undertaking a thesis. Alternatively, the newly-minted professor or inexperienced thesis
supervisor might pose these sorts of questions to the graduate student. While the MA or PhD
candidate should not be expected to answer them all, just thinking about them beforehand, and
discussing them with a supervisor, should help the student to write a better thesis. Variants of
these questions may also arise during the oral defence.
Selecting a Research Topic:
Try to choose a topic early. Scan the latest journals and books related to your interests.
Conduct some database searches on the Internet using key words that interest you. What are
other researchers and academics doing in your field of interest? Has someone already written
extensively on your favourite topic? Who are the main authors in your specialized area?
Overview at least three other theses in your department’s collection or the university library.
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Compared to other students, how much theory do you want to incorporate into your
thesis? How relevant do you want your thesis topic to be? What topic might potential
employers be interested in seeing on your resumé?
Framing Your Research Question:
Compose your thesis question. What is it you are specifically interested in finding out
about? What is the problem you intend to examine? How can this topic be framed in the form of
a question? For example, let us say you are interested in improving UN peacekeeping efforts
and you would like to work for the United Nations. Your specific question might be: “How has
the UN financed its peacekeeping operations?” Alternatively, you might be interested in the
problem of nuclear proliferation. Your specific question might be: “Why did South Africa
decide to rid itself of nuclear weapons?” Discuss your possible thesis question with others.
Present your supervisor with a brief written statement of the problem. Define concepts
where necessary. Express the problem in the form of a question. Can your research question be
further narrowed down? Describe the significance of the problem with reference to one or more
of the following criteria: Is it timely? Does it relate to a practical problem? Does it relate to an
influential, wide or critical population? Does it fill a research gap? Does it permit generalization
to broader theoretical principles or general theory? Does it sharpen the definition of an
important concept or relationship? Does it have implications for a wide range of
practical problems?
The Theoretical Framework:
Can your problem be related to a theoretical framework? Can the problem be related to
previous theoretical research? What set of theoretical questions are you asking? What debate
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in the literature are you addressing? Can your research fill a theoretical gap? Does it answer one
or many aspects of a theoretical debate? Will you present the theory (including the
methodology and important concepts) in a separate chapter or in parts? Will you make
theoretical propositions in the introduction? Could you discuss theoretical implications in the
conclusion? To what extent do you want to write a theoretical and/or policy-relevant thesis?
Formulating Researchable Propositions:
You may decide not to use a “positivist” framework to organize your thesis, preferring
an alternative research methodology (e.g. “interpretive,” “critical,” “comparative,” “historical”
approach, etc.). But by at least attempting to answer the following “positivist” (i.e. “causal,”
“empirical,” “scientific”) questions, you should make significant progress in terms of designing
your research project. Moreover, you may encounter a thesis examiner who wants to know,
“What are your ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ variables?”
First, could you transform your theoretical propositions into researchable propositions?
Try to assert your propositions in the form of one-sentence “hypotheses.” Now ask the
hypotheses in the form of questions. Do any of your propositions overlap and can any questions
be eliminated? Do they make common sense or are they far-out and controversial?
Although you do not need to use a positivist explanation, you should at least think about
your possible independent, intervening, and dependent “variables.”2 What you want to explain is
the dependent variable (B). Why does B occur? The independent variables (A) contribute to B.
What do you suspect are the most important or significant independent variables? Can you argue
that Given A, you expect B will occur? Are there any exceptions? Can you narrow your list of
independent (and intervening) variables to include only those that you suspect are most
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important and significant? Remember that a MA or PhD thesis is not supposed to be a
magnum opus. Focus your analysis upon the variables that you suspect are most important.
What criteria might you use to evaluate the “testability” of your research propositions?
In other words, what kinds of evidence could you turn up to prove and disprove your
propositions? What kinds of evidence might lead you to reject your propositions? What kind of
evidence would you need? What sort of evidence do you expect to get? Are you looking for
evidence stemming from individual-level, state-level or systemic-level interactions? What levels
of analysis will you study during the research process?
How will your present your evidence? For example, if you decide to use the case-study
approach, why did you select your particular case studies? Was your case-selection biased?
Recognize that many theses end-up with fewer case studies than was initially planned. Are all
your cases well chosen? Alternatively, if the bulk of your evidence is derived from logical
reasoning (e.g. “game theory,” “rational choice theory,” etc.), what “counter-arguments” seem
to oppose or contradict your reasoning? On the other hand, if you are inclined to be more
historical or interpretive, how much detailed chronological explanation do you need to provide?
What scale will you use to “measure” significant factors or variables? (e.g.
quantitative, semi-quantitative, qualitative?) Are you prepared to undertake the kind of research
necessary in order to measure your variables? (e.g. mathematical, survey, public opinion, indepth interviews, content analysis?) Are any important concepts in need of measurement? (e.g.
intensity, frequency, amount, number?) How will you assess the measure of change,
significance or importance?
Conducting Research:
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The research process should happen all year around, not in the crucial months before
the final deadline for submission. Do not be discouraged if, at the beginning, you are
overwhelmed by too much information. Much of your most highly-relevant research may take
place in the final weeks and months leading up to the penultimate draft.
What patterns, trends, or series are you looking for during research? How are you
going to structure your analysis of the evidence? Why? What alternatives have you
considered? Why is your method preferable? What are its advantages and disadvantages?
What kinds of theoretical- and policy-relevant conclusions can you draw? How
confident are you of these conclusions given your research methodology? For instance, do
you think 2-3 case-studies can lead to general conclusions? Is your comparative casestudy method useful? Are your logical conclusions merely commonsensical, not a new
contribution to knowledge?
At this stage, you should be prepared to advance a central argument or thesis based on
your research. Does the evidence generally confirm or disconfirm your initial suppositions? How
would you now qualify your research propositions? Should you reword them to be more
accurate? And now that the bulk of your research is completed, what do your findings teach us?
Do they teach us something important? Have they solved at least part of an important puzzle?
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Introduction and Conclusion:
Save time and refrain from writing the Introduction and Conclusion until the main body
of the thesis is written. Remember that some of the points you make in your Introduction can be
repeated in your Conclusion.
When writing the Introduction and the Conclusion, you could consider the mistakes you
made, their consequences, and seriousness. What would you do differently now that you have
conducted the research? Assess your method of gathering information. How valid was it and
how would you now improve your research process? With your supervisor, discuss how your
conclusions could be fed back into theory. What theoretical implications does your research
indicate? You could also mention how your findings could have an impact upon policy. What
policy-relevant lessons can be learned from your research?
In the Conclusion, you may mention what you intend to research in the future,
knowing what you know now. In light of your work, indicate areas that are now ripe for
further research. While writing the Conclusion, students also tend to refine their arguments
and write excellent summaries. Could you promote some of this material to the front, where it
might do the reader more good?
Final Draft:
Can you excise sections that are there only, it seems, because you did the research,
not because they are necessary to the logic of your argument? Every section, paragraph,
and sentence should be there only if it advances your overall argument.
Headings need not be mere labels (e.g. “Background” or “Conclusion”) but can be
more descriptive and precise (e.g. “Is NATO Expansion Bound to Fail?”). Do your headings
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explain and reflect the Table of Contents? In the abstract, have you stated your argument clearly
so that there is no confusion about what is and is not argued? Tests and evidence should be
explained fully. Have you noted the sources of all your charts and graphs? Have you
acknowledged and addressed legitimate counter-arguments? Have you summarized the debate
of which your thesis is a part, and specified what previous literature it confirms or revises?
Your thesis will be read by scholars familiar with your field of inquiry and it may also
by read by non-specialists. Does it explain sufficient historical, technical, and theoretical
background? Is it well-organized and clearly presented so that readers may easily grasp the
significant points?
Remember other graduate students and friends can give useful advice before you submit
your thesis for formal consideration. In reacting to their comments, it is mistaken to assume that
their confusion is due to stupidity or ignorance. What are the reasons behind their confusion?
How might you contend with each criticism or suggestion?
Of course, it is not a good idea to hand your friends or supervisor a manuscript with
careless typing and spelling, single-spaced type, or faint print. The word “final draft” should
mean “the best I can do.” Have you carefully read your drafts? Are the pages and footnotes
or endnotes consistently numbered? Your advisors will have suggestions, and you should
feel free to debate those suggestions and reasons. But you have the final responsibility for
content, presentation, and errors.
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Common Thesis Problems
There are many well-known (and some rather unusual) techniques that can be used to
conquer common thesis difficulties. Procrastination, in particular, can be a problem among MA
and PhD candidates. The tips in this section are meant to help overcome standard barriers to
thesis completion.
Problems Framing the Research Question:
During the first year or semester, try to read as much as possible. Browse through the
library stacks. Scan related journal articles. Look at other MA or PhD theses for ideas about
feasible topics. Narrow down your question as much as possible. Refrain from writing your
magnum opus. There will be lots of time to do that later. Do not be shy to take your
supervisor’s time. Throw around ideas. Chat. Write down your interesting ideas on filecards.
Throw most of them away. Follow your hunches.
Common Research Problems:
You do not have to read everything. Over-researching is a common problem. If you
do not know how to search for information using the Internet, make sure you ask someone to
teach you. Most graduate students are using the World Wide Web to quickly and efficiently
conduct research.3 Update your bibliography as you conduct your research, in the proper
format on your computer. You can waste valuable time later looking up references you
mislaid. Try to write a draft once you have done fifty percent of your research. Then fit your
research information into your draft. Many people continue to do research because they are
afraid of writing. You may need to bribe yourself to sit in front of your (blank) computer
screen. Or force yourself to face a blank piece of paper.
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Problems with Writer’s Block:
Confronted with writer’s block, start writing anything. Write why you hate your
research project, write a letter to a friend explaining your thesis, write your mother an
explanation of your research question. “I hate this thesis because...” “This is a stupid topic
because....” Tell your inner critic to get lost. Your inner critic is fond of phrases such as:
“This is stupid!” “You don’t know anything and you should do more research!” “You better
go back and correct that sentence!” Instead try to write as if you were explaining your ideas
to a friend or a relative, someone who is not a critic but a fan. Also ask for your supervisor’s
email or postal address and write progress reports if you do not have time to drop-by
frequently, or you are shy. Vow to keep in touch with your supervisor, especially if you are
having problems. Common Writing Mistakes:
When explaining a concept or theory, such as “post-modernism” or “realism,” do not
use the critics’ works to explain the concept. Take the time to examine and cite original
authors. Moreover, do not cite someone else’s interpretation of an original idea. For example,
do not use undergraduate texts as a source of conceptual definitions. Examine and footnote the
original source.
As you write the first draft, refrain from editing and proofreading. Considerable time can
be wasted editing on the computer. If you dislike writing first drafts, take the attitude, “I’m just
going to bang out a few pages.” Strive for at least three pages a day. Remember to give the reader
“signposts” to indicate where you are going. For instance, restate your interpretation of the
findings and provide conclusions that summarize preceding paragraphs. Use many headings and
sub-headings. Remind your erstwhile reader of what has already been explained. And
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recognize that by the time you write the last chapter, the first chapter will need to be revised.
This is not a disaster, and is actually expected. Indeed, you will probably have to do many
serious revisions of your entire thesis. Do not be discouraged. You can get a lot more done than
you think you can in a short time.
Computer Errors:
Your computer’s spellcheck will not pick up all your spelling errors. Be sure to read over
your draft before handing it to your professor. It is usually better to be late than to submit a
poorly-written draft. You will be judged in part based on your writing ability. If you cannot write
clearly, it is assumed you are not thinking clearly. Print-up your work frequently. Keep copies of
your disks and your drafts in different locations just in case of fire, tornadoes, and earthquakes.
For peace of mind, save your work everyday. If you are experiencing computer or printer
problems, solve them now, not when deadlines loom.
Style Frustrations:
Purchase and study a style manual. Decide whether to use the Modern Language
Association (MLA) or American Psychological Association (APA) style. Check that your
chosen style is acceptable according to the official thesis guideline issued by your
department or university. Be consistent and footnote your sources and bibliography
correctly from the beginning. Do not make up your own distinctive style. For example, do
not write pgs. instead of pp. Do not place the publisher before its location. Do not mix the
MLA and APA documentation styles.
Err on the side of over-footnoting, rather than under-footnoting. Study journal articles
in your field to assess when and what they footnote. Be careful not to paraphrase someone’s
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analysis and pass it off as your own. You cannot just change a few words here and there in a
paragraph. If you have not provided evidence in the main body of your writing to back-up
an assertion, you can list in a footnote or endnote the materials that would buttress your
argument. Statements of fact should be properly documented. Quotations and interviews
need to be properly noted. Frequently ask yourself, “Can I footnote this comment rather
than retain it in the main text so as to eliminate confusion, save space, and retain the essay’s
coherence?” Problems with Procrastination:
Among graduate students, serious procrastination is common and expected.
Why do you procrastinate?
•

Other Activities are More Interesting. Most other activities promise a shorter-term
pay-off (e.g. movies, socializing, sports).

•

Loneliness. Studying is lonely. Being in the library is isolating. “Everybody else
seems to be having a good time!”

•

Too Much Work. You are behind. It is hard to decide where to begin and easier not to.

•

Guilt. Other things need pressing attention. Laundry, broken-hearted friend, the dog
needs a walk...

•

Fear of Failure. You do not understand the topic and your supervisor is confusing.
Other graduate students seem so informed and in control.

•

Fear of Success. If you do well, everybody’s expectations will rise. You will eventually fall
on your face and embarrass yourself because deep-down, you know you are a failure.4 By
analyzing the reasons you procrastinate, you may be able to set-up the conditions to end
procrastination. For example, you can schedule rewards (e.g. exercise) after completing X
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hours of work. You can study at the library with others. You can prioritize long-term
and short-term goals. You can ask for more feed-back from your advisor. You can build
up your confidence by setting short-term deadlines.
Techniques to Conquer Serious Procrastination:
•

Just Do It! Prioritize.

Get an egg-timer and apportion your time. Work when you will be least bothered. Do
not get sidetracked and socialize during study times. Reward yourself with short-term rewards
(e.g. lunch, coffee, cigarette, chat). Keep asking yourself, “Does this activity help me achieve
my top priorities?”
•

Punish or Reward Yourself!

If procrastination is a serious problem, rewards may not be sufficiently compelling, and
you may have to resort to punishment. As it is difficult to punish yourself, you may need to get
someone else to do it for you. Write cheques to your least favourite organization. Give them to
your supervisor or a friend. If you do not complete a page, paragraph or chapter by the
deadline, s/he starts mailing cheques...$200 later, you may start writing!
•

Just Say No!

When asked to make other commitments, say “I’ll think about it” instead. If pressed, do a
little something but not a lot. Continually ask yourself whether you are overbooking your
time because you are afraid to work on your top priority (your thesis!)
•

Banish worry thoughts! Get to the task!

Do a little bit at least. Divide the task into smaller chunks. Substitute the mental message, “I
should...” with “I’d like to...” Write down all the worst things that could happen on pieces of
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paper. Put them aside. Read them a few months later. You will see that the worst things did not
happen. Life is a series of problems but the worst scenario seldom materializes. And if it does,
you will manage because you have inner reserves.
•

Strive to Stay Balanced!

Smile! Get regular exercise. Eat properly. Do not burn the candle at both ends!
Put silly sticky notes and visual reminders everywhere: “Do not worry, be happy,” “This too
will pass,” and “In the giant cosmos of things, this is totally unimportant”. Memorize this poem
by Goethe, one of the world’s most beloved and prolific authors: “What you can do or dream
you can, begin it! Boldness has genius, power, and magic in it. Only engage and the mind
grows heated. Begin it and the work will be completed!”
I WOULD PREFER IF YOU CUT THE FOLLOWING...
Coping with Family, Friends, and Partners
Despite their best intentions, friends, relatives, and life partners can hinder the steady
progress of the “All-But-Dissertation” (ABD) student. These ten rules, written tongue-in-cheek,
could be tactfully distributed by the ABD as part of a coping strategy or politely proffered by the
concerned supervisor as a prelude to a serious discussion of the difficult problems that bedevil
many graduate students:
Your ABD (All-But-Dissertation) Plant: 10 Rules For Care and Feeding
1. Think of your ABD as a tender seedling that needs plenty of water and
careful tending before it grows into a sturdy MA sapling or PhD tree.
2. Expect your ABD will be susceptible to frequent bouts of procrastination,
depression, and “lackadaisicalness.” Sometimes an ABD plant will wilt, despite the best
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growing conditions. However, often an ABD will shoot upwards, exhibiting a surprising growth
spurt in understanding. (The reasons for such rapid bursts of growth remain inexplicable).
3. Talk to your ABD plant. But do not focus upon the ABD’s dissertation, its rate of
progress, and when, exactly, it will finish growing. Instead talk to the ABD about pleasantries
such as Mozart, puppies, gardening, and flowers.
4. Remember that if you were never an ABD, you have no idea of what it is really like.
Even if everyone in your garden plot was an ABD, and you grew up surrounded by ABDs, you
will not completely understand the growth process. Whereas you may suspect you would
complete a thesis more speedily and efficiently, telling your ABD this will not help it grow more
quickly.
5. Some ABDs grow to fruition more quickly than others. Many are stymied by poor
soil conditions (e.g. lack of money), overcrowding (e.g. more family members), looming shade
(e.g. loneliness) and overbearing heat (e.g. demanding friends and lovers). Sometimes ABDs
overcome one problem simply to encounter another. Often what seems an insurmountable
barrier to the ABD really isn’t—if the ABD decides to grow over it.
6. The best growing environment for the ABD is simply to be left alone. Solitude. Time
to focus on the primary task. The ABD impacted by too many earthly concerns cannot use finite
amounts of energy properly and may not grow—may even fall over and decompose.
7. If you are a gardener in the ABD’s plot of life, refrain from prodding, cutting-up or
transplanting the ABD. Do not abruptly move your ABD to a different location or transplant the
ABD into a larger, more expensive plot. If the ABD requires different growing conditions, the
ABD will make them known—in any case, ABDs need very little to grow.
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8. Recognize that most ABDs will attempt to grow in many directions at the same time.
Often an ABD digresses into growing leaflets, expanding root systems, or meanders in different
directions. Frequently inquire of your ABD whether this activity is necessary for proper growth:
“Do you really need to do this now?” If the ABD is ambivalent, assist your ABD to resist these
energy-wasters.
9. Have faith that one day, your ABD may bear fruit. It is as if the ABD has an invisible
biological time-clock. An ABD driven by this time-clock will strive to meet deadlines, even those
that are self-imposed. Stern admonitions, pointed reminders, and poignant tears, however, will not
help the ABD to reach this final growth spurt more quickly. Indeed, too much prodding or
chiding, and the ABD may grow away from you.
10. Be aware that the ABD that grows overly slowly may have to make way for other
rapidly growing ABDs. For such an ABD, earthly existence will appear disappointing; good
ideas fail to germinate; the fruit of long labour begins to rot. On the other hand, with careful
attention and feeding, and a root structure firmly embedded in a deep understanding of the field,
your MA sapling or your PhD tree will flower abundantly, bear fruitful ideas, spread hundreds
of seedlings, and scatter many pages of leaves.

This article contains personal advice and recommendations based on my experience and the experience of

1

others engaged in writing theses or supervising graduate students. The views expressed are not necessarily the
views of any department or university. The author would like to thank the following professors for useful
suggestions, as well as advice on earlier drafts of this paper: Thomas Homer-Dixon, Michael Keating, David
Langille, H. Peter Langille, Sid Noel, Cranford Pratt, Paul Pross, Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Graham Simpson,
and Janice Stein. Useful tips were also put forward by professors and graduate students in the Department of
Political Science at the University of Western Ontario during the 1995-99 Political Science
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MA Workshops. Thank you to these workshop attendees for their tips. If you have other suggestions,
please email me at Simpson@julian.uwo.ca
2

On the difference between independent, intervening, and dependent variables, see for example, Earl

Babbie The Practice of Social Research 3rd ed., (Wadsworth Publishing Company: Belmont, California),
1983 and Kjell Erik Rudestam & Rae R. Newton Surviving the Dissertation: A Comprehensive Guide to
Content and Process (Sage Publications: Newbury Park, California), 1992, ch. 2, pp. 11-16.
3

For example, “Northernlights” at http://www.northernlight.com/docs/aboutintro.htm is an outstanding new

search engine for scholars and researchers. It searches over 3000 scholarly journals and magazines in its
Special Collection, as well as the World Wide Web. One-sentence abstracts of scholarly articles are sorted
into customized folders.
4

These reasons for procrastination are summarized from Joan Fleet, Fiona Goodchild, Richard

Zajchowski Learning for Success: Skills and Strategies for Canadian Students (Toronto: Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich), 1990, ch. 3, pp. 25-34.
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